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The specter of inadvertently disclosing the confidences of a client
hangs over every attorney. With the growth of complex litigation,
inadvertent disclosure1 of privileged materials is an increasingly
common problem, particularly in cases involving the production of large
amounts of material.' One can easily imagine how, in the course of a
massive document production, privileged materials escape the attention
of the producing side and are inadvertently disclosed.
Such disclosure raises a number of issues. One issue is whether the
disclosure waives the attorney-client privilege: which in turn involves

1. "Inadvertent disclosure" has been defined as "the unintentional revelation of the
contents of a document otherwise subject to the attorney-client privilege." Note, Inadvertent
Disclosure of Documents Subject to the Attorney-Client Privilege, 82 MICH.L. REV. 598, 598
n.5 (1983). "Inadvertent disclosure" should be distinguished from involuntary disclosure that
results from theft or illegal eavesdropping, see generally Natalie A. Kanellis, Comment,
Applicability of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Communications Intercepted by Third Parties,
69 IOWAL. REV. 263 (1983) (describing the circumstances under which the attorney-client
privilege should attach to communications discovered by a third party), or intentional actions of
disgruntled employees, see In re Grand Jury Proceedings Involving Berkley & Co., 466 F. Supp.
863 (D. Minn. 1979) (stating that documents given to an adversary by a client's employee do
not automatically lose privileged status). The difference between an inadvertent disclosure and
and involuntary disclosure is that the former is caused by actions of the client or its attorney
acting as its agent while the latter is caused by an outside force. See Note, supra, at 612-14.
~nstanceswhere a party voluntarily discloses information and later regrets it are also
distinguishable. See Note, supra, at 604-05. One commentator gives the example of a party who
intentionally reveals privileged information during settlement discussions as a negotiating tactic.
Richard L. Marcus, The Perih of Privilege: Waiver and the Litigator, 84 MICH.L. REV. 1605,
1633 (1986). The party may not be able to later claim the privilege, if a settlement is not
reached, on the grounds that he is sorry he revealed the information. Id. Different considerations
are raised by these different forms of disclosure. This Article is limited to an analysis of
implications of an inadvertent waiver.
2. A rough guide to the increasing number of inadvertent disclosures is the increase in
reported cases addressing the issue. A computer search covering all jurisdictions found that
through 1979, only 14 opinions discusssed the topic. From 1980 to August 1994, 171 opinions
addressed the topic. Search of LEXIS, Genfed Library, Mega file (Aug. 1994). Practitioners have
attempted to minimize the effects of inadvertent disclosures by including in their discovery
request responses language reserving their rights to claim privilege on inadvertently disclosed
materials. See, e.g., W.R. Grace & Co. v. Pullman, Inc., 446 F. Supp. 771, 774 (W.D.Okla.
1976).
Some courts have ruled that the reservation of rights is unenforceable. See, e.g., id. at 775
("The purported reservation contained in [defendant's] Response was in effect a legal nullity.
One cannot produce documents and later assert a privilege which ceases to exist because of the
production."). A better view is that the disclaimers alone should not be a litmus test of waiver,
but should be considered as one factor in judging whether an attorney took reasonable
precautions to avoid disclosure.
3. The following is a standard working definition of the attorney-client privilege that will
be used throughout this Article:
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whether the attorney intended to waive the privilege, and whether the
attorney had authority from the client to make such a waiver. A second
issue deals with the remedies available to the client if there is a waiver.
A third issue concerns the conflict between the courts' rules concerning
an inadvertent disclosure and the professional bar's ethical rules of
professional responsibility.
To put this conflict into perspective, consider the following model:
Companies A and B are involved in a large contract dispute that has
resulted in a lawsuit. B's attorney serves a document request upon A's
Attorney for all documents related to the transaction. Within the 10,000
documents A's attorneys produce are ten privileged documents containing legal advice from A's former attorneys to A. Immediately after
realizing the error, A's attorneys request that the documents be returned.
B's attorneys refuse the demand. A's attorneys then go to court for a
protective order. Depending upon the jurisdiction, this inadvertent
disclosure may or may not be treated as a waiver of the attorney-client
pri~ilege.~
Additionally, the disclosure and the opposing counsel's
refusal to return the document may violate the ethical obligations of
both attorneys.'

(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought, (2) from a professional legal
adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4)
made in confidence, (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected,
(7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be
waived.
8 JOHNH. WIGMORE,EVIDENCE
IN TRIALS AT COMMONLAW 3 2292, at 554 (John T.
McNaughton rev., 1961) (emphasis omitted).
4. Compare Georgetown Manor, Inc. v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 936, 938 (S.D.
Fla. 1991) (stating that inadvertent disclosure of documents is insufficient to constitute a waiver
of the attorney-client privilege) with International Digital Sys. Corp. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 120
F.R.D. 445, 450 (D. Mass. 1988) (holding that the attorney-client privilege is automatically
waived with inadvertent production) and Underwater Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co.,
314 E Supp. 546,549 (D.D.C. 1970) (stating that once a privileged document is produced, the
attorney-client privilege is automatically waived).
5. See infa part II for a discussion of the attorney's ethical duty of confidentiality. In
addition to the ethical duty of confidentiality, a competing ethical duty may exist in Model Rule
1.3 which requires an attorney to act with "reasonable diligence arid promptness in representing
a client." MODELRULESOF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCTRule 1.3 (1994 ed.) [hereinafter MODEL
RULES]. The comment to Rule 1.3 notes that the rule requires an attorney to "act with
commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the
client's behalf." Id. Rule 1.3 cmt. At least one court has suggested that an attorney is bound by
professional obligations to use information that is inadvertently disclosed for the client's benefit.
See ~erojet-GeneralCorp. v. Transport Indem. Ins., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, g67 (Cal. Ct. App.
1993).
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Only by examining the goals served by the attorney-client privilege
and the ethical rules on confidentiality can one decide whether
inadvertent disclosure waives the attorney-client privilege. Commentators agree that the purpose of both the attorney-client privilege and the
ethical rules regarding confidentiality is to encourage frank cornmunication between the client and his a t t ~ r n e y .Such
~
openness, in turn,
"promote[s] broader public interest[ ] in the observance of law and
administration of j~stice."~
Many cases and commentators have focused solely on answering the
narrow question of whether there has been a waiver of the attorneyclient privilege when privileged documents are inadvertently disclosed.'
Accordingly, their analyses have not considered all of the broader policy
goals implicated by the inquiry. Many commentators are primarily
For
concerned with how to limit waiver of the attorney-client pri~ilege.~
example, at least one commentator has stressed issues of fairness,"
while another has analogized the question to a determination of property
rights." Too little attention, however, has been given to the question
of fostering attorney responsibility to maintain confidentiality and the
results of the inadvertent disclosure in terms of attorney culpability.

6. See infra notes 121-29 and accompanying text.
7. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
8. See George A. Davidson & William H. Voth, Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege,
64 OR. L. REV. 637, 640-46 (1986); James M. Grippando, Attorney-Client Privilege: Implied
Waiver Through Inadvertent Disclosure of Documents, 39 U . MIAMI L. REV. 51 1, 512-22
(1 985); Scott L. Lanin, Survey of New York Practice: Developments in the Law, 62 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 751, 752-59 (1988); Wesley M. Ayres, Comment, Attorney-Client Privilege: The
Necessity of Intent to Waive the Privilege in Inadvertent Disclosure Cases, 18 PAC. L.J. 59.7080 (1986); Kanellis, supra note 1, at 276-77; Note, supra note 1, at 623-24.
9. Unlike the courts, which traditionally have had antagonism toward the attorney-client
privilege, and have therefore given expansive interpretation to waiver, see, e.g., Permian Corp.
v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that a corporation waived any
protection of the attorney-client privilege by turning over documents to the Securities and
Exchange Commission), most commentators have asserted that the privilege's benefits outweigh
its costs, that waiver be more limited, and have advocated adoption of various tests. See, e.g.,
Davidson & Voth, supra note 8, at 645-46 (recommending a subjective intent test); Grippando,
supra note 8, at 527 (advocating a conduct analysis approach); Roberta M. Harding, Waiver: A
Comprehensive Analysis of a Consequence of Inadvertently Producing Documents Protected by
the Attorney-Client Privilege, 42 CATH.U. L. REV. 465,485 (1993) (advocating a variation of
the subjective intent test which creates a rebuttable presumption against waiver); Marcus, supra
note 1, at 1654 (suggesting a fairness approach); Alan J. Meese, Inadvertent Waiver of the
Attorney-Client Privilege by Disclosure of Documents: An Economic Analysis. 23 CREIGHTON
L. REV. 513, 543 (1990) (arguing for a conduct standard which emphasizes prevention of
inadvertent disclosure).
10. See Marcus, supra note 1, at 1654.
11. See Meese, supra note 9, at 543.
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This Article suggests that fostering the development of attorney
responsibility should be the central goal in addressing the issues raised
by the inadvertent disclosure. Deciding the waiver issue by concentrating on attorney responsibility will help prevent inadvertent disclosures
(and resultant waivers) by impressing upon the attorney the need to take
care to avoid them. When disclosures inadvertently occur, the amount
of precautions the attorney took (albeit unsuccessfully) should determine
whether the privilege is waived. Placing the onus of precautions against
inadvertent disclosure on the attorney is not only beneficial to the client,
but also aids the profession, and the overall administration of justice.
These systemic goals underlie the doctrines of privilege and waiver.
American courts use three different tests to evaluate whether
inadvertent disclosure waives the attorney-client privilege. All three tests
use intent as the basis of a waiver, but each uses a different measurement of intent. The traditional test focuses solely on the act of disclosure, deeming it representative of the. client's intent to waive his
privilege.12 The subjective intent test is premised on the client's actual
desire to waive the privilege; it therefore holds that an inadvertent
disclosure never amounts to a waiver.I3 The reasonable precautions test
measures intent to waive by the precautions taken to prevent inadvertent
disclos~re.'~
This Article focuses on the attorney's legal and ethical responsibilities to the client and analyzes the three tests of waiver the courts use in
terms of their impact on promoting attorney responsibility. Part One
describes the current caselaw governing inadvertent disclosure. It also
describes the American Bar Association's (ABA) first formal ethical
opinion on inadvertently disclosed information that appears to advocate
a variation of the subjective intent test by creating a presumption against
waiver that must be overcome by the receiving attorney." The opinion
takes this position by stressing the forwarding attorney's property rights
in the document.^.'^

12. See, 'e.g., W.R. Grace, 446 E Supp. at 775.
13. See Shriver v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 145 F.R.D. 112, 115 (D. Colo. 1992);
Georgetown Manor, 753 F. Supp. at 938; Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 531 E Supp. 951,
954-55 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Pitard v. Stillwater Transfer & Storage Co., 589 So. 2d 1127, 1128-29
(La. Ct. App. 1991).
14. See h i s Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc., v. Levi Strauss & Co., 104 F.R.D. 103, 105
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (describing a five-factor analysis).
15. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-368
(1992), reprinted in LAWYER'SMANUALON PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT:MANUAL(ABAIBNA)
at 1001: 155 [hereinafter ABA].
16. See id. at 1001:159 (referring to an inadvertent mailing as creating a constructive
bailment or a bailment implied by law).
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Part Two discusses the attorney-client privilege and its analytic
counterpart, the ethical duty of maintaining confidentiality, identifies the
goals of each and the tension that has developed between them, and how
they may be reconciled. Part Three analyzes each test from an attorneyresponsibility perspective and concludes that the reasonable-precautions
test best serves the client's interests, and therefore has systemic benefits,
by properly forcing the attorney to bear the risks of inadvertent
disclosure. It reconciles the ABA opinion with this conclusion by
making two suggestions. First, to the extent that one views the AE3A
opinion as adopting the subjective intent test, the opinion should be
limited to its facts-the instance of a single, errant disclosure, rather
than applying it to the far more common occurrence of the inadvertent
disclosures taking place within a complex litigation with massive
document productions. Second, the Article demonstrates that the AE3A
opinion, with its emphasis on property rights, in fact, endorses a
reasonable precautions test.

Before turning to the three different tests used in deciding whether
an inadvertent disclosure of privileged materials waives the attorneyclient privilege, two preliminary subjects require attention: (I) attorney
authority to waive, and (2) intent to waive.
A. Authority to Waive the Privilege
The first step in deciding the question of waiver is the determination
of who has the authority to waive the privilege. While the attorneyclient privilege rests solely with the client,17 only a minority of cases

17. See, e.g., ALA. CODE 5 12-21-161 (1975) ("No attorney . . . shall be competent or
compelled to testify in any court in this state for or against the client as to any matter or thing,
knowledge of which may have been acquired from the client, or as to advice or counsel to the
client given by virtue of the relation as attorney . . . unless called to testify by the client . . . .")
(emphasis added); CAL. EVID.CODE5 954 (West Supp. 1994) ('yT]he client, whether or not a
party, has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another from disclosing, a confidential
communication between client and lawyer. . . .") (emphasis added); IDAHOCODE 5 9-203
(1947) ("An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any
communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of
professional employment."); KAN. STAT. ANN. 3 60-426 (1994) ("[C]ommunications found by
the judge to have been between lawyer and his or her client in the course of that relationship
and in professional confidence, are privileged, and a client has a privilege . . . to prevent his
or her lawyer from disclosing it.") (emphasis added); MONT. CODE ANN. 8 26-1-803 (1993)
("An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication
made by the client to him or his advice given to the client in the course of professional
employment."); N.Y. Clv. PRAC.L. & R. 4503 (McKinney 1993) ("Unless the client waives the

Heinonline - - 47 Fla. L. Rev. 164 1995

19951

165

INADVERTENT DISCLOSURE OF PRIVILEGED MATERIAU

hold that waiver may only be accomplished by the client." The
majority use the concept of implied authority to find waiver when there
is something less than the classic situation of a client intentionally
An attorney, designated by the
divulging confidences to a third-part~.'~
client as his agent to comply with a document production request, is
deemed to have implicit authority to waive the client's privilege?'

B. The Intent to Waive
Intent is the cornerstone of the waiver issue under all of the current
tests. Under a purist view, waiver is deemed the " 'intentional relinquishment . . . of a known right,' " that only the client may exercise?'
Many courts are less rigid, however, and hold that intent, as well as
authority to waive, may be implicit.22The common thread among all
of the waiver tests is that it is the client's intent that governs. Even
cases adopting the concept of implicit authority that allows the attorney
to waive the privilege, still speak of waiver as representing a manifesta-

...

privilege, an attorney
shall not disclose, or be allowed to disclose such communication
.").Resting the privilege with the client is a shift from early common law days where
supra note 3, 8 2290.
the privilege rested with the attorney. See WIGMORE,
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct also make confidentiality a client's right. MODEL
RULES, supra note 5, Rule 1.6(a) ("A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to
representation of a client unless the client consents after consultation. . .") (emphasis added).
The same approach W a s taken by the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, the predecessor
DR 4-101(C) (1986)
to the Model Rules. See MODEL CODEOF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
("A lawyer may reveal . [clonfidences or secrets with the consent of the client or clients
affected, but only after a full disclosure to them.") (emphasis added).
18. See Mendenhall, 531 F. Supp. at 955. Courts adopting the subjective intent test to
address the issue of inadvertent disclosure take a purist view of waiver as the intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right, and roundly criticize the attempts to gloss over
this fundamental requirement. Id.
19. See ICI Americas Inc. v. Wanamaker, No. 88-1346, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4057, at
*7-*8 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 18, 1989); Permian, 665 F.2d at 1219-21 (reasoning that the privilege
could not be waived for one opponent and then subsequently invoked against another opponent);
Goldsborough v. Eagle Crest Partners, Ltd., 838 P.2d 1069, 1073 (Or. 1992); cf: Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938) (requiring competent and intelligent waiver by accused to
waive right to counsel).
20. Goldrborough, 838 P.2d at 1073. This adoption is rarely explicit-most cases do not
lay out the analytical groundwork of expressing that the attorney is the client's agent. See
Manufacturer & Traders Trust Co. v. Servotronics, 522 N.Y.S.2d 999, 1004 (App. Div. 1987).
See generally Davidson & Voth, supra note 8, at 645-46 (discussing the application of agency
theory to attorney-client privilege); Note, supra note 1, at 604 n.27 (stating that "when an
attorney negotiates or litigates on behalf of a client, the courts will probably conclude that the
client has impliedly authorized the attorney to waive his privilege").
21. Mendenhall, 531 F. Supp. at 955 (quoting Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464).
22. See, e.g., United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461,465 (E.D. Mich.
1954).

...

.

..
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tion of the client's intent; no court has gone so far as to measure waiver
by the attorney's intent?3
The differing views on measuring the client's intent have spurred the
development of four schools of thought on the issue of inadvertently
disclosed documents. The four tests represent a spectrum ranging from
one absolute view embodied by the traditional test that a party's intent
to waive is established by the fact of disclosure24to the polar view
embraced by the subjective intent test that a party's intent to waive must
be explicit, thereby eliminating waiver through inadvertency?' The
reasonable precautions test stands in the center of the spectrum, judging
~~
waiver by the circumstances surrounding the d i s c l ~ s u r e .Closely
aligned to the subjective intent test is the ABA view that creates a
presumption against ~ a i v e r . 2 ~
1. The Traditional Test
The traditional test of inadvertent disclosure rests on Dean
Wigmore's view, as adopted by many courts, that the attorney-client
privilege suppresses the truth?* These courts counter the privilege's
perceived costs in shielding relevant evidence by giving waiver an
expansive definiti~n?~
In such courts, the client's intent to disclose
privileged materials and to waive the privilege is found simply by the
disclosure itself.30Thus, while the traditional test ostensibly acknowledges that intent is the basis of waiver, intent is established solely by
the act of disclosure. This approach is similar to the principle of strict

23. See, e.g., Goldsborough, 838 P.2d at 1073. As some commentators have pointed out,
attempting to measure intent in an inadvertent disclosure situation is a legal fiction since by
definition, no specific intent by the client to disclose exists in the inadvertent situation. See
Marcus, supra note 1, at 1607 ("[I]ntention[ ] is not a useful guide because truly intentional
waivers are extremely rare."); Developments in the Law-Privileged Communication: VII.
Implied Waiver, 98 HARV.L. REV. 1629, 1664 (1985) ("[A]nalysis of the privilege-holder's
intent is unhelpful . . . .").
24. See, e.g., Kelsey-Hayes, 15 F.R.D. at 465.
25. See, e.g., Mendenhall, 531 F. Supp. at 955.
26. See, e.g., Lois Sportswear, 104 F.R.D. at 105.
27. See ABA, supra note 15, at 1001: 155.
supra note 3, 5 2291, at 557 (explaining that the attorney-client privilege
28. WIGMORE,
is an exception to the duty to disclose, and thus an obstacle in discovering the truth). For cases
utilizing the traditional inadvertent waiver test, see Wichita Land & Cattle Co. v. American Fed.
Bank, 148 F.R.D. 456, 457 (D.D.C. 1992); International Digital Sys. Corp. v. Digital Equip.
Corp., 120 F.R.D. 445,449-50 (D. Mass. 1988); W.R. Grace, 446 F. Supp. at 775; Underwater
Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546, 549 (D.D.C. 1970).
29. See, e.g., W.R. Grace, 446 F. Supp. at 775; Underwater Storage, 3 14 F. Supp. at 549.
30. See, e.g., W.R. Grace, 446 F. Supp. at 775; Underwater Storage, 3 14 F. Supp. at 549.
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liability used in tort and criminal offenses where the act is the decisive
factor in deciding ~ulpability.~'
Two rationales support the traditional test's measure of the act as the
bright-line test of the client's intent. The first rationale is that the client
has the ability to protect the confidentiality of privileged materials and
that, therefore, any disclosure is a manifestation of the client's lack of
The second
intent to keep the confidential status of the rnaterial~?~
rationale is that once the confidence is revealed, there is nothing left to
protect and therefore, the privilege is ~ a i v e d . 3 ~
The seminal traditional test case is United States v. Kelsey-Hayes
~ ~ involved an anti-trust action?' The plaintiff sought
Wheel C O . ,which
to have one of the defendants admit the genuineness of 1000 documents
the plaintiff had culled during an examination of the defendant's files?6
The defendant objected to this request as to twenty-nine documents
inadvertently included in the files given to the plaintiff, which it claimed
were communications between attorney and ~lient.3~
Rejecting the
defendant's contention, the court reasoned that the attorney-client
privilege only covers communications "as to which there is an intention
The court noted that the defendant's own act of
of c~nfidentiality."~~
turning over privileged documents caused the plaintiff to view its
31. See, e.g., United States v. Park, 421 U.S: 658,668 (1975) (ruling that no mens rea was
needed for a finding of guilt under a strict liability statute); Commonwealth v. Miller, 432
N.E.2d 463,465 (Mass. 1982) (holding that the act of statutory rape was sufficient for a finding
of guilt; no mens rea was required); State v. Stepniewski, 314 N.W.2d 98, 104 (Wis. 1982)
(holding that no mens rea was needed under state unfair trade practices law).
32. See W.R. Grace, 446 F. Supp. at 775; Underwater Storage, 314 F. Supp. at 549.
33. See, e.g., Golden Valley Microwave Foods, Inc. v. Weaver Popcorn Co., 132 ER.D.
204,209 (N.D. Ind. 1990); W.R. Grace, 446 E Supp. at 775; Underwater Storage, 314 F. Supp.
at 549; Kelsey-Hayes, 15 F.R.D. at 464-65.
This rationale has been expressed in a variety of metaphors, the most popular being the "bird
cage" theory of confidentiality-"[Wlhen a secret is out it is out for all time and cannot be
caught again like a bird and put back in its cage." State v. Bloom, 193 N.Y. 1, 10 (N.Y. 1908).
Other common characterizations also refer to the horse being out of the barn, Ray v. Cutter Lab.,
746 F. Supp. 86, 88 (M.D. Ha. 1990) (quoting Hamilton v. Hamilton Steel Corp., 409 So. 2d
1111, 1114 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)), or the rabbit being out of the hat. Marcus, supra note 1, at
1635.
34. 15 F.R.D. 461 (E.D. Mich. 1954).
35. See id. at 462. Interestingly, there is no clear consensus as to which waiver theory the
case represents. Kelsey-Hayes has been categorized as the "seminal case" on the strict liability
traditional approach, see Davidson & Voth, supra note 8, at 641, and as representing an early
example of the conduct, or reasonable precautions, approach, see Meese, supra note 9, at 523;
Ayres, supra note 8, at 79. This Article views the proper categorization of Kelsey?Hayes as a
traditional or strict responsibility case. See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
36. Kelsey-Hayes, 15 F.R.D. at 464.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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confidential com~nunications.~~
The inadvertent nature of the disclosure
was irrelevant to the court, which ruled that the fact of disclosure
manifested the intent to disclose, because the defendant took no
particular care to protect the privileged status of the document^.^'
Moreover, relying on the traditional test's second rationale, the court
reasoned that there was no longer any need for the privilege because the
To
plaintiff now knew the contents of the secret cornm~nication.~~
enforce the privilege, would, according to the court, "amount to no more
than mechanical obedience to a form~la."~'

2. The Subjective Intent Test
The subjective intent test is premised on a literal definition of waiver
as the " 'intentional relinquishment . . . of a known right.' "43 Courts
embracing this test hold that inadvertent disclosure of privileged matters
can never operate as a waiver since the client's specific intent to waive

39. Id.
40. Id. at 465. It is this mention of the lack of precautions taken that has made some
commentators view the case as representing a reasonable precaution standard. See, e.g., Meese,
supra note 9, at 524. However the court's citation to Wigmore, Kelsey-Hayes, 15 F.R.D. at 464,
who without doubt is the leading advocate of the strict liability approach, makes it clear that the
case does not represent a reasonable precautions test.
41. Kekey-Hayes, 15 F.R.D. at 464-65.
42. Id. at 465.
43. Mendenhall, 531 F. Supp. at 955 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464
(1938)). The Mendenhall court based its definition of waiver on the Johnson court's definition
of waiver, even though Johnson involved the waiver of a constitutional right. Johnson, 304 U.S.
at 459, 464. According to the Mendenhall court, "[TJhe same concept applies to waivers
Y (5th
generally." Mendenhall, 531 F. Supp. at 955 n.9 (citing BLACK'SLAWD I ~ O N A R1417
ed. 1979)).
This linchpin to the subjective intent test has not been without detractors who argue that
waiver of an evidentiary privilege should be judged by a different standard than waiver of a
constitutional right because in the former situation, the waiver need not be knowingly made. See
Transamerica Computer Co. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 573 F.2d 646, 650 (9th Cir.
1978) (stating that although there may be a difference between waiver of evidentiary privileges
and constitutional rights, defendant did not waive attorney-client privilege when compelled to
produce documents); Kanter v. Superior Court, 253 Cal. Rptr. 810, 814 (Ct. App. 1988)
("Although the privilege is a statutory creation and should be protected and nurtured, it is not
as sacred as a constitutional right, which should require a knowing and intelligent waiver before
it is lost."). Recently, the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177,
183 (1990), implied that the Johnson definition of waiver is limited to waiver of criminal trial
rights. What effect this decision has on the subjective intent test remains to be seen.
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must be established? This test is the opposite of the traditional test,
which finds intent solely from the fact of disclosure?'
The leading subjective intent case is Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene
C O . Plaintiffs
~~
counsel inadvertently allowed opposing counsel to
review all client files relating to a pending patent infringement case.47
Four privileged communications were within the files?' When defense
counsel later requested copies of the communications, plaintiffs counsel
~
counsel
refused on attorney-client privilege g r o ~ n d s ?Defendants'
sought to compel produ~tion?~
In denying the defendants' motion to produce, the court held that
"mere inadvertent production does not waive the pri~ilege,"'~adopting
the United .States Supreme Court's standard in Johnson v. Zerbst that
waiver is premised on an " 'intentional relinquishment or abandonment
of a known right.' "" The court reasoned that inadvertent production
is antithetical to knowing ~ a i v e r . 5 ~
The majority of courts have rejected the subjective intent test on the
grounds that it is too inflexible." Some courts have criticized the test's
insistence that waiver must be express since the client's self-interest in
preserving the privilege may color whether intent to waive exists?' It
44. See Shriver v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 145 F.R.D. 112, 115 @. Colo. 1992);
Georgetown Manor, Inc. v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 936, 938 (S.D. Fla. 1991);
Mendenhall, 531 F. Supp. at 954-55; Pitard v. Stillwater Transfer & Storage Co., 589 So. 2d
1127, 1128-29 (La. Ct. App. 1991).
45. See, e.g., Underwater Storage, 314 F. Supp. at 549 (stating that the court would not
look behind the objective fact of production to determine whether the party intended to have the
letter examined).
46. 531 F. Supp. at 951.
47. Id. at 952 n.2.
48. Id. at 952.
49. Id. at 952 n.2.
50. Id. at 952.
51. Id. at 954.
52. Id. at 955.
53. Id.
54. See Note, supra note 1, at 606 n.31. Many courts have expressly rejected the
subjective intent test. See, e.g., Kanter, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 814; Dalen v. Ozite Corp., 594 N.E.2d
1365, 1371-72 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992). Other courts implicitly reject the subjective intent test by
adopting one of the other tests of waiver. See, e.g., SEC v. O'Brien, No. 91-145,1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 18146, at *2-*3 (D.D.C. Aug. 26,1992); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 142 F.R.D. 276,
279 (M.D.N.C. 1992); Advanced Medical, Inc. v. Arden Medical Sys., Inc., No. 87-3059, 1988
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7297, at *5 (E.D. Pa. July 18, 1988); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Garvey, 109
F.R.D. 323,332 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
55. See Champion Int'l Corp. v. International Paper Co., 486 F. Supp. 1328, 1332 (N.D.
Ga. 1980); Kanter, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 817 ("Under the subjective approach, a waiver would
almost never be found. From a practical standpoint, the privilege holder could claim the
privilege at any time, even long after the party knew that the opposing side had received

Heinonline - - 47 Fla. L. Rev. 169 1995

170

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.47

would be the rare client who, in opposing a motion to produce, or in
support of a motion for a protective order, states that he intended to
In effect, adopting a
disclose the documents and waive the pri~ilege.'~
subjective intent approach gives blanket protection to clients and will
rarely result in finding waiver based on inadvertent d i s c l ~ s u r e . ~ ~
According to one court, the test can cause instability in a judicial
proceeding since a party may not know whether the document produced
will later be allowed into evidence."
Commentators generally are more receptive to the subjective intent
test than the courts.59Some agree with the Mendenhall court's reasoning that waiver must be intentionaL6' Others maintain that the subjective intent standard is the most cost-effective, noting that the crucial
consideration should not be of the producing party's state of mind at the
time of production, which by definition does not include specific intent
to disclose, but of his state of mind at the time he is alerted to the
prod~ction.~'
Finally, some commentators, in advocating adoption of
the subjective intent test, note that some harm does result from a ban on
the use of inadvertently revealed information because relevant information is suppressed, bui that this harm is outweighed by the privilege's
benefk6'

privileged documents."); see also Ayres, supra note 8, at 81-82 ("[Tlhe self-interest of the client
would raise significant questions concerning the reliability of a client's statement that the
supra note 3, 5 2327, at 636 ("A
privilege was not intended to be waived."); WIGMORE,
privileged person would seldom be found to waive, if his intention not to abandon could alone
control the situation.").
56. See Kanter, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 817.
57. See id.
58. See id. (stating that "the privilege holder could claim the privilege at any time"); see
also Marcus, supra note 1, at 1636 ("[Ilf unintended delivery of privileged material could always
be taken back . . . there could be continual uncertainty about whether privilege would actually
be asserted as to items produced in discovery, a prospect that could disrupt trial preparation.").
Of course, stability alone is not a sufficient rationale for adopting a particular waiver test. Were
it so, the traditional test would be the test of choice since it is so easy to apply-if documents
are disclosed, the privilege is waived. See W.R. Grace, 446 F. Supp. at 775 (defining the
traditional test); supra text accompanying notes 28-3 1.
59. See, e.g., Meese, supra note 9, at 536; Ayres, supra note 8, at 80-81.
60. Ayres, supra note 8, at 80.
61. Meese, supra note 9, at 531. Characterizing the privilege as a type of property right,
id., the author's analysis appears to be adopted almost fully by the ABA's formal opinion on
inadvertent disclosure. See infra text accompanying notes 209-12; ABA, supra note 15.
62. See Marcus, supra note 1, at 1616-17; Meese, supra note 9, at 535.
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3. The Reasonable Precautions Test
The reasonable precautions test was conceived as a modern day
answer to the strict Wigmore-based traditional test.63Recognizing that
in sophisticated multi-party litigation with enormous document
productions, documents do get inadvertently disclosed, the test measures
intent by examining the disclosing party's conduct and the circumstances
surrounding the disclosure to determine whether intent to waive
exists.64In doing so, the reasonable precautions test replaces bright-line
approaches, such as those used in the traditional testb5which measures
intent by the fact of disclosure, or in the subjective intent testb6which
requires that the client's actual intent to waive be e~tablished.'~This
totality-of-circumstances approach has evolved into a five-factor analysis
as first set forth in Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss &
CO.~~

63. See Note, supra note 1, at 616-18 (asserting that a reasonable precautions test is a
better test of client's intent to maintain confidentiality than stricter tests such as the traditional
approach).
64. See id. at 619-23 (describing features common to document production which can help
courts decide whether reasonable precautions have been taken).
65. See supra text accompaying notes 28-31.
66. See supra text accompanying notes 43-44.
67. The reasonable precautions test may be seen as the natural outgrowth of the earlier
traditional cases that used the lack of precautions as a means of bolstering their rationale that
the client could have taken the steps needed to preserve confidentiality. See generally KelsbHayes, 15 F.R.D. at 465 (denying privilege existed where client had failed to take adequate
precautions to keep documents confidential); Underwater Storage, 314 F. Supp. at 549 (stating
that no attorney-client privilege existed as to letter inadvertently disclosed by attorney). This
rationale may be the case in singular erroneous disclosure, but is unrealistic in cases where
thousands, sometimes millions, of documents are produced. See, e.g., Trmamerica, 573 F.2d
at 648 (describing difficulties in screening for privileged documents, when party is compelled
to produce approximately 17 million pages).
68. 104 F.R.D. 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). Earlier cases rejected the traditional test in favor of
a test that evaluated the precautions taken to avoid disclosure, see, e.g., National Helium Corp.
v. United States, 219 Ct. C1. 612, 614 (1979) (finding only question as to whether the privilege
attached was whether the procedure followed by the party claiming the privilege was so lax,
careless or inadequate that the party must be objectively considered as indifferent to disclosure
to adverse party); Data Sys., Inc. v. Philips Business Sys., Inc., No. 78 Civ.-6015-CSH, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 1981) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, DIST File) (rejecting an objective intent test
and noting that party claiming privilege took every precaution possible to secure privileged
documents); however, the Lois Sportswear court was the first to articulate the five factor
approach. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Garvey, 109 F.R.D. 323. 330-31 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
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(1) The reasonableness of the precautions taken to prevent
inadvertent disclosure in light of the extent of document productiod9
In considering this factor, the courts look at the mechanics of the
overall document production and how the accidental disclosure
occurred.70 This factor requires that the party producing documents
devise a screening mechanism to cull privileged material.71 The
complexity of the screening procedure will depend on the number and
nature of the documents to be prod~ced.~'The courts are also concerned with the staffing of the screening procedure, with most courts
requiring that the persons reviewing the material have some legal
expertise for the courts to find that the procedure was r e a s ~ n a b l e . ~ ~
69. Lois Sportswear, 104 F.R.D. at 105.
70. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Invesrigation, 142 F.R.D. at 279-80.
71. See id.; Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Marine Midland Realty Credit Corp., 138 F.R.D.
479,483 (E.D. Va. 1991).
72. See Marine Midland, 138 F.R.D. at 483. The courts consider the amount of documents
to be produced and the time frame of the production in weighing the adequacy of a screening
mechanism. See id. For example, the court in Marine Midland held that using only two lawyers
for one day to review tens of thousands of documents was inadequate. See id. In contrast,
another court held that the producing party acted reasonably in reviewing 300,000 documents
over a two-month period under a multi-layer screening procedure staffed by attorneys and
paralegals that resulted in the inadvertent disclosure of 18 documents. See In re Grand Jury
Investigation, 142 F.R.D. at 279-80.
Transamerica describes perhaps one of the most onerous document productions ever
undertaken. In a previous related action, the district court had ordered defendant, IBM, to
produce more than 17 million pages of documents within a three-month period. Transamerica,
573 F.2d at 648. In attempting to meet this deadline, IBM devised an elaborate screening
mechanism to pull out privileged documents. See id. The screening procedure involved a pageby-page initial review of each of the 17 million pages of documents by junior attorneys,
followed by a tagging process for potentially privileged documents, followed by a another
review of the tagged items by more senior attorneys, followed by an intricate duplication process
for partially privileged material. Id. at 649. Despite what the circuit court deemed a "herculean
effort," id. at 648, 1138 privileged documents were inadvertently disclosed. Id. at 650. The
plaintiff sought to compel production of the documents, arguing that IBM's previous inadvertent
disclosure waived the privileged status of the documents. Id. at 647. The lower court denied
plaintiffs motion to compel production of the documents. Id. In a novel approach to the waiver
issue, the circuit court avoided deciding whether an inadvertent disclosure waived the privilege
by holding that the disclosure was compelled by the lower court's onerous discovery schedule,
and that since the disclosure was not voluntary, it could not amount to a waiver. Id. at 651. No
later court has used the Transamerica court's theory of compelled disclosure.
73. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 142 F.R.D. at 279 (holding screening
reasonable when conducted by outside senior and junior attorneys together with a paralegal);
Chrysler Capital Corp. v. Bankers Trust Co., No. 91 Civ. 5090, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3176,
at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 1992) (holding that screening was reasonable when conducted by two
attorneys and a paralegal); Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v. Sewotronics, Inc., 522
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(2) The number of inadvertent disclosure^^^
The courts consider the total number of documents produced
compared to the number of privileged documents inadvertently
relea~ed.~'
The reasonableness of the precautions taken is determined
in light of the.total document production b~rden.7~
(3) The extent of the disclosure77

The reasonable precautions test considers the extent of the disclosure?8 Courts treat instances where an adversary has learned the
contents of a document differently from instances where an adversary
merely learns of its existence?' As one court noted,

N.Y.S.2d 999, 1005 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) ("[Ilf a screener could not reasonably be expected
to differentiate between privileged and non-privileged documents, the reasonable precaution test
would not be met. This could occur if counsel delegated the screening function to a paralegal
or to someone with no legal training.").
74. Lois Sportswear, 104 F.R.D. at 105.
75. See, e.g., Parkway Gallery Furniture, Inc. v. Kittinger/PemsylvaniaHouse Group, Inc.,
116 F.R.D. 46.51 (M.D. N.C. 1987).
76. Compare Kanter, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 819 (holding that 160 privileged documents
released out of 1600 was unreasonable); Liggett Group Inc. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 116 F.R.D. 205,207-08 (M.D.N.C. 1986) (releasing several documents out of one box
of documents deemed unreasonable) and Eigenheim Bank v. Halpern, 598 F. Supp. 988, 991
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (disclosing of 1 out of 30 documents deemed unreasonable) with In re Atlantic
Fin. Fed. Sec. Litig., No. 89-645, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2619, at *21 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 3, 1992)
(releasing 4 privileged pages out of 50,000 deemed reasonable); Chrysler Capital, 1992 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 2176, at *5 (releasing one small-print document contained in six boxes deemed
reasonable); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 142 F.R.D. at 280 (releasing 18 documents out of
300,000 held reasonable); Lois Sportswear, 104 F.R.D. at 5 (releasing 22 documents out of
16,000 reviewed deemed reasonable); Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co. v. Marathon Oil Co.,
109 F.R.D. 12, 21 (D. Neb. 1984) (releasing 1 document out of 75,000 deemed reasonable).
77. h i s Sportswear, 104 F.R.D. at 105.
78. See id.
79. Compare Stavanger Prince WS v. M N Joseph Patrick Eckstein, No. 92-0983, 1993
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1610, at *5-*7 (E.D. La. Feb. 10, 1993) (stating that information in a
privileged letter known to one adverse party should in fairness be known to all adverse parties);
Marine Midland, 138 F.R.D. at 483 (finding waivers where the documents' entire contents are
known); Kanter, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 820 (noting that plaintiff had actually incorporated the
privileged document into his trial strategy) with In re Grand Jury Investigation, 142 F.R.D. at
281 (finding that since documents did not reach the grand jury, confidentiality could be restored
and privilege invoked); Chubb Integrated Sys. Ltd. v. National Bank of Wash., 103 F.R.D. 52,
63 (D.D.C. 1984) (stating that the mere fact that the adverse party had an opportunity to open
a file drawer cannot constitute a disclosure of privileged information); Ranney-Brown Distrib.,
Inc. v. E.T. Barwick Indus., Inc., 75 F.R.D. 3, 6 (S.D. Ohio 1977) (finding no waivers where
disclosure was limited to glancing at documents or merely designating them for copying).
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A limited disclosure resulting from glancing at an open file
drawer or designating documents for copying may not
justify a finding of waiver when the party does not know
the essence of the document's contents. However, when
disclosure is complete, a court order cannot restore confidentialit and, at best, can only attempt to restrain further
erosion.

X

Thus, when the inadvertent disclosure reveals all, the courts have a
greater tendency to find waiver.81
(4) Promptness of response82
A party's prompt attempt to reclaim or block the use of inadvertently
disclosed materials is critical in ascertaining the intent to waive under
the reasonable precautions test.83Response time is the interval between
knowledge of the breach in confidentiality and the request for relief,
normally in the form of a motion for a protective order.84Courts are
more reluctant to find a waiver of the attorney client privilege when the
attorney moves promptly for reliefY8'than when attorneys know that the
adversary is in possession of privileged documents and do nothing for
an extended period.86 The promptness of the response is inversely
related to the level of reliance the adversary may claim it has in the
disputed materials. While the courts generally consider reliance in the
final, overall fairness
it is necessarily tied into the promptness
factor.

80. Parkway Gallery, 116 F.R.D. at 51-52 (citations omitted).
81. See, e.g., Golden Valley Microwave Foods, Inc. v. Weaver Popcorn Co., 132 F.R.D.
204,209 (N.D. Ind. 1990); Marine Midland, 138 F.R.D. at 483; In re Grand Jury Investigation
of Ocean Transp., 604 F.2d 672, 675 ( D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Sea-Land Serv., Inc.
v. United States, 444 U.S. 915 (1979).
82. Lois Sportswear, 104 F.R.D. at 105.
83. See, e.g., Manufacturers & Traders, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 1005.
84. See id.
85. See, e.g., Magnavox Co. v. Bally Midway Mfg. Co., No. 83 C 2357, at 4 (N.D. Ill.
Nov. 5, 1984) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, DIST File) (noting the promptness of the objection);
Manufacturers & Traders, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 1005 (noting that a protective order was sought two
business days after the inadvertent disclosure was discovered).
86. See, e.g., In re Conticommodity Servs., Inc., No. 644, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10358,
at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 1988) (two month delay); Kanter, 253 Cal. Rptr..at 820 (15-month
delay); cf: In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ocean Transp., 604 F.2d at 674-75 (using
traditional test of waiver but noting the party's 15-month delay in seeking relief).
87. Kanter, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 820.
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(5) Overall fairnesss8

Overall fairness is a final catch-all factor the courts use in determining whether a party took reasonable precaution^.'^ This factor looks
mainly to see if there are any special circumstances that justify
preserving the privilege, or vice versa, justify finding a waiver.g0 A
recipient's reliance on the privileged materials is considered a special
circumstance?' Thus, if the adversary has used the privileged documents as a cornerstone of its litigation or discovery strategy, the courts
are less likely to uphold the privilege, particularly if the producing
attorney had the opportunity to object to such use?'
Some commentators have criticized the five-factor analysis on the
grounds that it does not provide guidance in setting a standard of
reasonable care and that a case-by-case approach produces unpredictable
re~u1t.s.~~
Another criticism is that the test favors large f m practices
that have the means to create elaborate screening procedures to the
detriment of the solo pra~titioner.'~Notwithstanding these criticisms,
the judiciary is using the reasonable precautions test in growing
numbers?' Many commentators, however, recognize the benefits of the
case-by-case appr~ach?~

88. Lois Sportswear, 104 F.R.D. at 105.
89. Parkway Gallery, 116 F.R.D. at 50; Lois Sportswear, 104 F.R.D. at 105; Kanter, 253
Cal. Rptr. at 818, 820; Manufacturers & Traders, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 1004.
90. See, e.g., Parkway Gallery, 116 F.R.D. at 52.
91. See, e.g., Manufacturers & Traders, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 1005.
92. See, e.g., Grand Jury Investigation of Ocean Tramp., 604 F.2d at 675. One
commentator has suggested that reliance is an inappropriate criterion because the recipient is in
a much better position than the sender to know whether a document was inadvertently produced
and that notification to the producing party will preclude reliance. Meese, supra note 9, at 535.
This analysis does not place the proper emphasis on attorney responsibility. Situations exist
where a party may intentionally reveal privileged materials as part of a litigation or settlement
strategy. See Marcus, supra note 1, at 1633. The receiving party should not bear the
responsibility of ensuring that his or her adversary meant to make the disclosures. Moreover,
instances exist where it is not clear that a document is privileged. See, e.g.. International
Business Mach. Corp. v. Comdisco, Inc., No. 91-C-07-199,1992 Del. Super. LEXIS 255, at *1*3 (Del. Super. Ct. June 22, 1992). One can easily see how there may be reliance made upon
a document which is later discovered to be privileged.
93. See Harding, supra note 9, at 502-03; Lanin, supra note 8, at 756-59; Meese, supra
note 9, at 538-42; Ayres, supra note 8, at 79-80.
94. See Lanin, supra note 8, at 758; A. Leo Levin & Denise D. Colliers, Containing the
Cost of litigation, 37 RUTGERS
L. REV. 219,227-29 (1985); Marcus, supra note 1, at 1608-13.
95. See Meese, supra note 9, at 523-24; Harding, supra note 9, at 473-74; Ayres, supra
note 8, at 79.
96. See, e.g., Grippando, supra note 8, at 524-25; Note, supra note 1, at 619-24.
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4. ABA Formal Opinion 92-368
In response to a situation that arose in a complex asbestos litigation,
when a temporary secretary mistakenly sent a copy of the defendants'
jury selection strategy to plaintiff's counsel, the ABA issued its first
~ ~ opinion
formal opinion on the issue of inadvertent d i s c l o s ~ r e .The
begins with a blanket statement that
[a] lawyer who receives materials that on their face appear
to be subject to the attorney-client privilege or otherwise
confidential, under circumstances where it is clear they
were not intended for the receiving lawyer, should refrain
from examining the materials, notify the sending law er and
abide the instructions of the lawyer who sent them.

x

The opinion relies on two areas of law in support of its conclusion
that inadvertently produced materials should be returned: attorney-client
privilege and bailment.99As to the first area of law, the opinion notes
that the majority of cases concerning waiver of the attorney-client
privilege hold that mere inadvertence is insufficient to waive the
privilege.Io0 In so doing, the opinion dismisses the Wigmorian rule'''
that any disclosure should be deemed a waiver.''' What is less clear
is whether the opinion more closely aligns itself with the subjective
intent test or with the reasonable precautions test.Io3While the opinion
may be read as adopting the subjective intent test,"" it also appears to
be endorsing a reasonable precautions standard.''' For instance, the
opinion makes only passing reference to what it labels as a "minority"
rule established by the Mendenhall court.'06 Had it been the ABA's
intent to adopt a pure subjective intent test, it would not have relegated
the seminal case to a mere footnote. Additionally, it cites with approval
cases employing the reasonable precautions test.'07

97. See Cornelia H. Tuite, Missent Information Pits Ethics Against Evidence, CHI.DAILY
L. BULL.,Apr. 2, 1993, at 6.
98. ABA, supra note 15, at 1001:156.
99. Id. at 1001:155-60.
100. Id. at 1001:158.
101. WIGMORE,supra note 3, $ 2325, at 632.
102. See ABA, supra note 15, at 1001:158-59.
103. See Tuite, supra note 97, at 6.
104. Id.
105. See ABA, supra note 15, at 1001:158-59.
106. Id. at 1001:158 n.3.
107. Id. at 1001:158.
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Property law is the second basis upon which the ABA rested its
conclusion that clearly erroneous transmittals should be returned.Io8
According to the ABA opinion, the recipient is the constructive bailee
of the sender's property, here the document and the ideas contained
within it,Io9and therefore has a legal duty to return the document or
be faced with a conversion claim against it."' The ABA opinion notes
that there is "no rule of universal applicationyyas the right of the bailee
to use the bailed property,"' but acknowledges that one test to determine allowable usage by the bailee is whether "the consent of the owner
to the use may be fairly pre~umed.""~According to the ABA, in the
situation before it, the sending attorney could have only consented to the
The ABA opinion thus appears to
return of the missent do~ument."~
create a presumption against waiver that the receiving party must
rebut.l14 Here too, however, the opinion may be read as supporting a
reasonable precautions test because that is the standard typically
employed in other areas of property law involving confidential

communication^.^^^

108. Id. at 1W1:159. Bailment has been defined as "the rightful possession of goods by one
who is not the owner." 9 SAMUELWILLISTON,
A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF C O N T R A ~5S1030
(3d ed. 1957). There is usually an express or implied contract noting that the property will be
returned or accounted for when the purpose of the bailment has been accomplished. 8 AM. JUR.
2D Bailments 8 2 (1980). The bailee's right to use bailed property is governed by the
circumstances surrounding the bailment and the nature of the transfer of the property. Id. 8 207.
Again the question becomes how the recipient should know that the materials he received were
clearly not meant for him. Id. In the situation that the ABA was addressing, it would be clear
to any reasonable person that the secretary erred. However, this is not always the case. See supra
note 92.
109. Whether one may consider the information and ideas contained in a privileged
document as property, separate and apart from the physical page on which they are contained,
raises interesting issues. A detailed examination of these issues is beyond the scope of this
Article.
110. ABA, supra note 15, at 1001:159.
111. Id. at 1001:159-60.
112. Id. at 1001:160 (quoting 8 AM. JUR. 2D Baflments 8 207 (1980) (emphasis omitted)).
113. Id.
114. The opinion also notes that good sense and reciprocity are reasons for returning a
missent document. Id. at 1001:161. It discounted the competing ethical obligation of zealous
representation by stating that limitations exist on the extent to which a lawyer may go "all out"
for the client. Id. at 1001:157. For example, it noted that a lawyer may not view files or notes
that an adversary leaves out during a break in a deposition, or that an adversary inadvertently
leaves after a closing. Id. at 1001:160-61.
115. See, e.g., infra notes 224-27 and accompanying text.
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11. THELEGALAND THE ETHICALRESPONSES
TO
CONFIDENTIALITY:
THEA'ITORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE
AND THE ETHICALDUTYTO
MAINTAINCLIENTCONFIDENCES
Most courts and commentators have deemed that a client's ability to
engage in unfettered consultation with his attorney is so beneficial to
society that it overrides any specific concerns that shielding information
hinders the truth-seeking function of our adversarial system.Il6 Attor-

116. See, e.g., Meese, supra note 9, at 535. As the United States Supreme Court stated in
Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980), "[tlhe lawyer-client privilege rests on the
need for the advocate and counselor to know all that relates to the client's reasons for seeking
representation if the professional mission is to be carried out." See also Chirac v. Reinicker, 24
U.S. (1 1 Wheat.) 280, 294 (1826) (stating that the attorney-client privilege is "indispensable for
the purposes of private justice"); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perspective on the
Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CAL. L. REV. 1061, 1062 (1978) ("[Ihe issue concerning the
attorney-client privilege is not whether it should exist, but precisely what its terms should be.");
Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Corporate Client: Where Do We Go Ajier Upjohn?,
81 MICH.L. REV. 665,666 n.5 (1983) (stating that almost no one seriously advocates abolishing
the privilege).
Courts and commentators have set out a number of theories behind the attorney-client
privilege, with a cost-benefit analysis as most prevalent. See Meese, supra note 9, at 515-18;
Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications: III. Attorney-Client Privilege, 98 HARV.
L. REV. 1501, 15Dl-04 (1985) [hereinafter Attorney-Client Privilege]. This cost-benefit analysis
weighs the costs of protecting from view materials that may have bearing on the truth of the
controversy against the less tangible societal benefits, such as inducing clients to consult freely
with their attorneys to determine the legality of proposed acts, and to help a client through the
mire of the legal system once he is involved in litigation. See id. at 1502-03. According to a
cost-benefit analysis, the privilege hinders the truth-seeking function of litigation by shielding
evidence. See MARVINE. FRANKEL,
PARTISAN
JUSTICE 64-65 (1980); Marvin E. Frankel, The
Search for Truth Continued: More Disclosure, Less Privilege, 54 U. COLO. L. REV. 51, 65
(1982). However, as the courts and commentators have pointed out, without the privilege the
communication would not have been made in the first place, so there is no net cost. See, e.g.,
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981) ("Application of the attorney-client
privilege . . . puts the adversary in no worse position than if the communications had never
taken place."); Meese, supra note 9, at 518-19. Commentators have stressed the benefits of
encouraging unfettered discussions between lawyer and client. See, e.g., David A. Nelson,
Comment, Attorney-Client Privilege and Procedural Safeguards: Are They Worth the Costs?,
86 Nw. U. L. REV. 368, 384 (1992) (stating that the confidential forum provided by the
attorney-client privilege allows the attorney to provide sound legal advice). The privilege, in
encouraging the client to be honest with his attorney, promotes the ability of the lawyer to give
the client fully informed legal advice. See id. If the client does not discuss matters with such
frankness, the ability of the attorney to offer legal advice is impaired. See Albert W. Alschuler,
The Preservation of a Client's Confidences: 'one Value Among Many or a Categorical
Imperative?, 52 U. COLO. L. REV. 349, 352 (1981). Another benefit of the privilege is that it
encourages compliance with the law. See Davidson & Voth, supra note 8, at 638 ('"The attorney
to whom confidences are freely expressed has a greater opportunity to learn of and counsel
against potentially unlawful conduct.").
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ney and client communications are protected by two sets of rules. The
courts and legislatures have defined the attorney-client privilege, which
protects the client's confidential materials from forced disclosure within
a legal proceeding.ll7 The ABA has promulgated the Model Rules of

A strict utilitarian analysis notes only systemic benefits, rather than consideri;lg the benefits
that may occur in a particular litigation. Attorney-Client Privilege, supra, at 1505-06. Nonutilitarian theories of the purposes of the attorney-client privilege stress the client's personal
autonomy and privacy rights. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra, at 350-52. See generally AttorneyClient Privilege, supra, at 1501-04 (examining the history and rationales for the utilitarian and
non-utilitarian approaches). Non-utilitarians hold the disclosure of privileged communications
as intrinsically wrong notwithstanding any specific truth-seeking benefits the disclosure may
produce in the underlying litigation. Id.
A "full" utilitarian analysis would take into account non-utilitarian benefits in the costbenefit analysis, such as the client's right to know the law and to have an attorney act as his
representative. See id. at 1504.
117. WIGMORE,supra note 3 , s 2292, at 558-59. For citations to typical statutes, see supra
note 17. The attorney-client privilege has been called the "oldest of the privileges for
confidential communications known to the common law." See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389. The
common law origins of the attorney-client privilege appear to be in the late sixteenth century.
Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications: I. Introduction, The History of
Evidentiary Privileges in American L m ,98 HARV.L. REV.1454, 1456 (1985). Historians have
posited at least two justifications for the initial adoption of the privilege. The first possibility is
that it developed as an extension of the right against self-incrimination. Attorney-Client
Privilege, supra note 116, at 1501-02 (quoting 3 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES
* 370
(" '[Nlo counsel, attorney, or other person, intrusted with the secrets of the cause by the party
himself, shall be compelled, or perhaps allowed, to give evidence of such conversation or
matters of privacy, as came to his knowledge by virtue of such trust and confidence.' ")). A
second theory behind the initial adoption of the privilege is that it protected the lawyer whose
oath of loyalty to his client would be breached if he were forced to divulge his client's
supra note 3, $2290, at 543. One commentator has noted that both
confidences. See WIGMORE,
of these initial justifications are non-utilitarian. See Attorney-Client Privilege, supra note 116,
at 1502.
Distinct from the attorney-client privilege is the work-product doctrine. The landmark case
of Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), created an exception to the otherwise broad federal
discovery rules to protect an attorney's work-product. Under the work-product doctrine,
information gathered by an attorney in preparation for litigation is protected from discovery
requests, unless the opposing counsel demonstrates a need for its disclosure. Id. at 512. 1n
addition to Hickman, federal courts abide by the work product rule articulated in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which protects against disclosure of "the mental impressions,
conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party
concerning the litigation." FED.R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3).
The work product doctrine reflects a policy that attorneys should be free to investigate all
aspects of his client's case and devise strategy and tactics without the fear that such information
can be obtained by opposing counsel through discovery. See Hickman, 329 U.S. at 512-13. A
split of authority exists as to whether the work-product doctrine should be treated the same as
the attorney-client privilege for waiver purposes. See Chubb Integrated Sys. Ltd. v. National
Bank of Wash., 103 F.R.D. 52, 63 (D.D.C. 1984) ('There is a difference of opinion . . on
whether the concept of [implied waiver] applies only to attorney-client communications, or to

.
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Professional Conduct that impose ethical obligations on attorneys to
maintain their clients' confidences."' Both mechanisms encourage
work-product as well."). A number of courts have held that waiver of work-product immunity
requires more than the disclosure of confidential information; the disclosure must be
"inconsistent with the adversary system." See, e.g., id.; Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Garvey, 109
F.R.D. 323, 328 (N.D. Calif. 1985).
118. See MODELRULES,supra note 5, Rule 1.6. Rule 1.6(a) states: "A lawyer shall not
reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the client consents after
consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the
representation."
Originally, the ABA's Canons of Ethics, as enacted in 1928, required the lawyer to preserve
a client's confidences. See HERSCHEL
W. ARANT,CASESAND OTHER MATERIALSON THE
AMERICAN
BARAND ITS ETHICS app. at 647 n.1, 658 (1933). However, it offered no definition
of "confidences." See id. app. at 658. The Code of Professional Responsibility extends the
protection of attorney-client communications beyond those communications protected by the
RESPONSIBILITY
AND CODEOF
attorney-client privilege. See MODELCODEOF PROFESSIONAL
JUDICIAL
CONDUCT
DR 4-101 (1986) [hereinafter MODELCODE].Abandoning the "confidences"
used in the Canons of Ethics, the Model Code instead protects not only information protected
by the attorney-client privilege, but also secrets, which are defined as "information gained in the
professional relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which
would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the client." See id.
In 1977, the ABA appointed a commission to recommend changes to the Code. Robert W.
Meserve, Introduction to ANNOTATED
MODELRULESOF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT
4 (2d ed.
1992). Chaired by attorney Robert Kutak, it became known as the Kutak Commission. Hany I.
Subin, The Lawyer as Superego: Disclosure of Client Confdences to Prevent Harm, 70 IOWA
L. REV. 1091, 1105 n.81 (1985). The Commission proposed that attorneys be compelled to
disclose confidences to prevent death or serious bodily harm, to protect the court and parties
from false evidence, and to prevent unfair advantage by a client through fraud. Id. These
proposals were soundly rejected by the ABA membership. Id. Instead, the ABA adopted the
Model Rules Rule 1.6, its most extensive rule of confidentiality yet formulated. See MODEL
RULES,supra note 5, Rule 1.6 (stating under which particular circumstances confidential
information may be revealed). Rule 1.6(b) does not compel disclosure in the circumstances
articulated by the Kutak Commission. See id. See generally Subin, supra, at 1090 (advocating
that the attorney-client privilege and the ethical rules be reconciled and problems should be
resolved by applying a standard set of principles). Instead, it limits the attorney's ability to
disclose client confidences without the client's consent to the following instances:
A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably
believes necessary: (1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the
lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm; or
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between
the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim
against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to
respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of
the client.
MODELRULES,supra note 5, Rule 1.6(b).
Rule 1.6 does not require disclosure under these circumstances; the attorney has the option
to disclose or not. See id. In contrast, under the Model Code, an attorney may reveal:
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frank communication, but have differences which create tension between
them, particularly in the area of inadvertent disclosure.

A. Similarities
Rule 1.6 of the ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct states that,
"[a] lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a
client unless the client consent^.""^ The attorney-client privilege
similarly prohibits forced disclosure of privileged matters.I2"
The similarity between the attorney's ethical obligation of confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege is the goal of ensuring that the
client is free to safely share confidences with his attorney.'" Both
imply the need for attorneys to be able to give sound advice based on
full knowledge of the circumstance^.'^ The Supreme Court in Upjohn
Co. v. United States,'= a landmark case on the attorney-client privilege,'24 recognized the parallel justifications between the attorney-

.

(1) Confidences or secrets with the consent of the client or clients affected, but
only after a full disclosure to them.
(2) Confidences or secrets when permitted under Disciplinary Rules or required by
law or court order.
(3) The intention of his client to commit a crime and the information necessary to
prevent the crime.
(4) Confidences or secrets necessary to establish or collect his fee or to defend
himself or his employees or associates against an accusation of wrongful conduct.

MODELCODE,supra, DR 4-101 (footnotes omitted).
The judicially created crime-fraud exception is another exemption to the rule of confidentiality. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 842 F.2d 1223, 1226 (11th Cir. 1987). A client who
confers with his attorney with the intent to further a crime or fraud may not have his
communications with his attorney protected. See United States v. Laurins, 857 F.2d 529, 540
(9th Cir. 1988); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 842 F.2d at 1226.
119. MODELRULES,supra note 5, Rule 1.6(a).
120. See supra note 3 for a standard working definition of the attorney-client privilege.
121. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389; supra note 116; MODELRULES,supra note 5, Rule 1.6
cmt. [2].
122. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389; MODELRULES, supra note 5, Rule 1.6 cmt. [3].
123. 449 U.S. at 383.
124. In Upjohn, general counsel of Upjohn Pharmaceutical conducted an in-house
investigation of questionable payments made by Upjohn subsidiaries to foreign government
officials. Id. at 386. The investigation included a confidential and detailed questionnaire
distributed to several officials in Upjohn to ascertain the legal implications of the payments and
follow-up interviews of some officials. Id. at 386-87. After Upjohn voluntarily informed the
Securities and Exchange Commission and the Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S.) of the possible
existence of such payments, the I.R.S. issued a summons demanding production of the
questionnaire, memoranda, and notes of the follow-up interviews. Id. at 387-88. Upjohn
declined, and both the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan and the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the summons should be enforced, although for
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client privilege and the ethical duty of c~nfidentiality.'~~
The opinion
concerned the scope of the attorney-client privilege in the corporate
setting.'26 In addition to stating unequivocally that the attorney-client
privilege serves systemic goals of promoting the fair and just observance
and administration of law,'" the court commented on the ethical
obligations imposed by the ABA.lZ8It noted that the " 'ethical obligation of a lawyer to hold inviolate the confidences and secrets of his
client not only facilitates the full development of facts essential to
proper representation of the client but also encourages laymen to seek
early legal assistance. ,9129
9

B. Differences
Notwithstanding the similarities between the attorney-client privilege
and the ethical obligation to maintain confidentiality, significant
differences exist between the two. The prohibition against disclosure
contained in Model Rule 1.6 is broader than the protection provided by
the attorney-client privilege. Rule 1.6 extends protection to all information relating to a client's representation whatever its source, including
non-confidential matters, while the attorney-client privilege covers only
a client's communications made in confidence for the purpose of

different reasons. Id. at 388. On grant of certiorari, the Supreme Court held that such
information was protected by the attorney-client privilege. Id. at 386. In his opinion, Justice
Rehnquist articulated the dual rationale for the attorney-client privilege:
[The] purpose [of the privilege] is to encourage full and frank communication
between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in
the observance of law and administration of justice. The privilege recognizes that
sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and that such advice or
advocacy depends upon the lawyer's being fully informed by the client.
Id. at 389.
The holding in Upjohn and its implications have been closely examined. See, e.g., Marcus,
supra note 1, at 1620-22; Stephen A. Saltzburg, Corporate and RelatedAttorney-Client Privilege
Claims: A Suggested Approach, 12 HOFSTRAL. REV. 279, 291-95 (1983); John E. Sexton, A
Post-Upjohn Considerationof Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV.443,45673 (1982); Michael L. Waldman, Beyond Upjohn: The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate
Context, 28 WM. & MARYL. REV.473,487-500 (1987); Marshall Williams, The Scope of the
Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege in View of Reason and Experience, 25 HOW. L.J. 425.45057 (1982).
125. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 391.
126. See id. at 389-90.
127. Id. at 389.
128. Id. at 391.
129. Id. (quoting MODELCODEOF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY
EC 4-1 (1980)).
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obtaining legal advice.I3' Thus, an attorney's ethical obligations would
prohibit him from revealing any information he knew about or had
obtained from a person before he was retained, while the attorney-client
privilege extends only to information gathered in confidence for the
purposes of representation. Another distinguishing feature is that, unlike
the attorney-client privilege which applies only in judicial or other
proceedings,13' the rule of confidentiality applies in situations "other
than those where evidence is sought from the lawyer through compulsion of law."'32
In addition to the specific differences noted above, both differ in
their philosophical underpinnings. Because the attorney-client privilege
may operate as an information suppressor, many courts have held that
it must be narrowly construed,133and that it is easily waived.'34 Dean
130. Compare WIGMORE,
supra note 3, $2292, at 554 (stating that communications to legal
advisor made in confidence to obtain legal'advice is privileged under the attorney client
privilege) with MODELRULES,supra note 5, Rule 1.6 cmt. [5] ('"The confidentiality rule applies
not merely to matters communicated in confidence by the client but also to all information
relating to the representation, whatever its source.").
Thus under the Model Rules, all information relating to the representation is deemed covered
by the duty of confidentiality, without regard to whether it was gained in the professional
relationship. Id. Also, Rule 1.6 requires confidentiality of information relating to representation,
even if it was acquired before or after the professional relationship existed. See id.
The comments to Model Code EC 4-4 reflect the broader reach of ethical responsibilities
compared to the attorney-client privilege: "The attorney-client privilege is more limited than the
ethical obligation of a lawyer to guard the confidences and secrets of his client. This ethical
precept, unlike the evidentiary privilege, exists without regard to the nature or source of
information or the fact that others share the knowledge." MODELCODEOF PROFESSIONAL
RE~PONSIBIL~W
EC 4-4 (1986). In short, much information which is ethically protected will not
be privileged, but nearly all information protected under the privilege will also be ethically
protected. See STEPHEN GILLERS,REGULATION
OF LAWYERS:
PROBLEMS OF LAWAND ETHICS
17 (3d ed. 1992).
131. MODELRULES,supra note 5, Rule 1.6 cmt. [5].
132.. Id.
133. See, e.g., Suburban Sew 'N Sweep, Inc. v. Swiss-Bernina, Inc., 91 F.R.D. 254, 257
(N.D. Ill. 1981) ("A court must balance the possibility that the privilege indirectly promotes free
and honest communication with the policy of liberal discovery to enhance the search for truth.
For these reasons, the privilege must be strictly construed."); Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of
Am. v. Shamrock Broadcasting Co., 521 F. Supp. 638,641 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (stating that because
the privilege covers materials which would otherwise be discoverable, the privilege should be
narrowly construed); Underwater Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 314 E Supp. 546,
547 (D.D.C. 1970) (stating that the privilege has such an effect on the full disclosure of the truth
that it should be narrowly construed).
The courts' narrow construction of the attorney-client privilege reflects the American legal
system's philosophy of broad discovery. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure embody the
philosophy of broad discovery. The Federal Rules were adopted in 1938 pursuant to
congressional grant of power to the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of civil procedure. See
Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651,48 Stat. 1064 (codified at 28 U.S.C. 5 2072 (1994)). The original
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Rules and subsequent amendments were designed to encourage the availability of information
that was to be disclosed prior to trial. CHARLES
A. WRIGHTET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE
5 2001-2002, at 13-22 (1994); see FED. R. CIV. P. 26-37 advisory committee's
notes. Congress' goal in enacting the Rules was to facilitate " 'an orderly search for the truth
in the interest of justice rather than a contest between two legal gladiators with surprise and
technicalities as their chief weapons.' " Paul R. Sugarman & Marc G. Perlin, Proposed Changes
to Discovery Rules in Aid of "Tort Reform": Has the Case Been Made?, 42 AM. U. L. REV.
CASESAND OTHER MATERIALS
ON
1465, 1490 (1993) (quoting ARTHURT. VANDERBILT,
MODERNPROCEDURE AND JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION
10 (1952)).
The changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that went into effect on December 1,
1993, exemplify judicial and legislative concern for broad discovery. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26
advisory committee's note. The 1970 amendment to Rule 26 provided for broad discovery by
stating that "[plarties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action." WRIGHTET AL., supra, at 21. The
Advisory Committee note to Rule 26 state that under the Federal Rules, "court[s] must be
careful not to deprive a party of discovery that is reasonably necessary to afford a fair
opportunity to develop and prepare the case." FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee's note to
the 1983 Amendment. Before and after the Rule 26 amendments, courts have liberally construed
Rule 26 in order to provide both parties with information essential to proper litigation on all the
facts. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495,506-07 (1947); Young v. Lukens Steel Co., NO. 926490, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1462, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 10,1994); Robbins v. Camden City Bd.
of Educ., 105 F.R.D. 49,55 (D.N.J. 1985); Mitsui & Co. v. Puerto Rico Water Resources Auth.,
79 F.R.D. 72, 80 (D.P.R. 1978); Mallinckrodt Chem. Works v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 58
F.R.D. 348, 352-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Patton v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 38 F.R.D. 428,
429 (N.D. Ga. 1965). One court stated that "[tlhe basic philosophy of the present federal
procedure is that prior to trial every party to a civil action is entitled to the disclosure of all
relevant information in the possession of any person, unless the information is privileged."
Donovan v. Prestamos Presto Puerto Rico, Inc., 91 F.R.D. 222, 223 (D.P.R. 1981).
With the 1993 Amendments, liberal discovery is not only encouraged, it is mandated. See
FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee's note to 1993 Amendment. Rule 26 now provides for
automatic disclosure of certain information even before a discovery request is made. FED. R.
CIV.P. 26. The Rule provides:
M ~ O DTO
S DISCOVER
ADDITIONAL
MATIER
(a) REQUIRED DISCLOSURES;
(1) Initial Disclosures. Except to the extent otherwise stipulated or directed
by order or local rule, a party shall, without awaiting a discovery request,
provide to other parties:
(A) the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of each
individual likely to have discoverable information relevant to disputed facts
alleged with particularity in the pleadings, identifying the subjects of the
information;
(B) a copy of, or a description by category and location of, all documents,
data compilations, and tangible things in the possession, custody, or control of
the party that are relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity in the
pleadings.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26.
Justice Scalia's dissent from the Court's approval of the amended rules was based, in part,
on what he saw as the "intolerable strain upon lawyers' ethical duty to represent their clients and
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Wigmore noted that the privilege's "benefits are all indirect and
speculative; its obstruction is plain and concrete . . . . It is worth
preserving for the sake of a general policy, but it is nonetheless an
obstacle to the investigation of the truth."13'
In contrast to the narrow view of privilege adopted by some courts,
the ABA takes a much more expansive approach to the duty to maintain
~0nfidentiality.I~~
An ABA's formal opinion has noted that the rules
governing a lawyer's professional conduct, "reflect a far more positive
view toward the importance of maintaining the confidentiality of
attorney-client communications" than does the attorney-client privilege.137Thus, despite the complementary nature of the two bodies of
law,I3' the development of separate legal devices addressing client
confidences has created the potential for conflict between the attorneyclient privilege and the ethical duties of an attorney to maintain
c~nfidences.'~~
This conflict is especially apparent in the area of inadvertent
disclosures, particularly in light of the ABA's only formal opinion on
the topic which may be construed as calling for a blanket rule requiring
inadvertently disclosed materials to be returned.lN Therefore, an
attorney may be put in a situation where he has violated an ABA rule
not to assist the opposing side" that is caused by mandating automatic discovery. Amendments
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 507, 511 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). A similar concern may be raised by requiring that the recipient of inadvertently
disclosed privileged materials return them. See infa note 142 and accompanying text.
134. See, e.g., Weil v. Investmentfindicators, Research & Management, Inc., 647 F.2d 18,
24 (9th Cir. 1981) (" '[ilnadvertence' of disclosure does not as a matter of law prevent the
occurrence of waiver' "); Advanced Medical, Inc. v. Arden Medical Sys., Inc., No. 87-3059,
1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7297, at *5 (E.D. Pa. July 18, 1988) ("Inadvertent disclosure of an
otherwise privileged document does not as a matter of law preclude a finding of waiver.");
UnderwaterStorage, 314 F. Supp. at 549 ("Once the document was produced for inspection, it
entered the public domain.").
Not all courts are resistant to upholding the attorney-client privilege and to minimizing the
waiver doctrine. Courts embracing the subjective intent test view the privilege as supreme. See,
e.g., Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 531 F. Supp. 951, 955 (N.D. 111. 1982).
supra note 3, $ 2291, at 554; see also Teachers Ins., 521 F. Supp. at 641
135. WIGMORE,
("mhe privilege covers materials which otherwise would be discoverable. ."); United States
v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357,358 @. Mass. 1950) (stating that the privilege
can result in the suppression of evidence).
136. See supra notes 118, 130 and accompanying text.
137. ABA, supra note 15, at 1001:159.
138. See id. at 1001:158.
139. See supra notes 117,118 and accompanying text for a discussion of the privilege rule
and ethical duty to maintain confidentiality; and supra note 5 for a discussion of the related
ethical obligation to zealously represent one's client, which is implicated in the inadvertent
disclosure arena.
140. See ABA, supra note 15, at 1001: 155.

..
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in abiding by caselaw that allows him to keep the material.14' In
contrast, an attorney who returns inadvertently sent material that he was
legally entitled to retain, he may risk a malpractice claim, even though
he has abided by the professional rules of ethics.14*
Analyzing the waiver issue by concentrating on the goals sought to
be obtained by both the attorney-client privilege and the ethical rules of
conduct will help resolve this dilemma. As this Article discusses,
enhancing attorney responsibility should be the governing precept in
deciding waiver since it best serves the underlying goals of promoting
client confidence in the legal system and the fair administration of
justice. Viewing the waiver question from the vantage of attorney
responsibility, the reasonable precautions test is the most appropriate test
of waiver since it encourages professionalism. This, in turn, protects
client confidences and allows the attorney to conform his conduct to
meet ethical obligations.

111. ANALYSISOF THE TESTSIN LIGHTOF
ATTORNEYRESPONSIBILITY
Using attorney responsibility as a tool in deciding waiver issues is
in full compliance with both utilitarian and non-utilitarian analyses of
The systemic benefits that utilitarians
the attorney-client ~rivi1ege.l~~
weigh include the "observance of law and administration of justice."'44
Promoting attorney responsibility is particularly important in today's day
and age where reports of public distrust of attorneys are increasingly
Attorney responsibility also fosters the non-utilitarian
considerations behind the attorney-client privilege because it promotes
the client's desire and ability to rely on attorneys, something that is
needed to "help[ ] laymen protect their rights and avoid litigation in the
141. See, e.g., Underwater Storage, 314 F. Supp. at 549.
142. See infra note 160 on the feasibility of bringing a malpractice claim in the inadvertent
disclosure situation. Recently, a California court of appeals ruled that the lower court improperly
sanctioned a lawyer who was the recipient of inadvertently transmitted privileged documents for
using the documents. Aerojet-General Corp. v. Transport Indem. Ins., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 86768 (Ct. App. 1993). In reversing the lower court, the court noted that "[olnce [the recipient] had
acquired the information in a manner that was not due to his own fault or wrongdoing, he cannot
purge it from his mind. Indeed, his professional obligation demands that he utilize his knowledge
about the case on his client's behalf." Id.
143. For a discussion of the utilitarian and non-utilitarian analyses of the attorney-client
privilege, see supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
144. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389.
145. See, e.g., Rorie Sherman, Overhaul of Lawyer Discipline on Docket, NAT'L L.J., Mar.
Sept.
21, 1994, at A6; Kay Saillant, A Plea Against Lawyer Jokes Brings Backlash, L.A. TIMES,
29, 1993, at B3 (quoting the President of the State Bar of California, who noted that "attorneys
rated 'just above used-car salesmen' " in public confidence polls).
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face of complex laws."146 This section analyzes the various waiver
tests currently used against the backdrop of attorney responsibility.
A. Attorney Responsibility and the Traditional Test

Though easy to apply, the simplistic strict liability approach
embodied by the traditional test does not adequately address the modern
realities of inadvertent disclosure. The traditional test's first rationale
that the client's intent to waive is manifested solely by the fact of
dis~losure'~~
is unrealistic at best and punitive at worst. The traditionalists seek to "punish" the client by placing the onus of maintaining the
confidentiality of privileged materials on him.148The rationale flouts
the stated purpose of the privilege: to promote free flow of information
between attorneys and clients.I4' Punishing the client hampers the
desired flow of inf~rmation.'~"

146. Attorney-Client Privilege, supra note 116, at 1504 n.21 (citing Stephen A. Saltzburg,
Privileges and Professionals: Lawyers and Psychiatrists, 66 VA.L. REV. 597, 605 (1980)).
147. See Underwater Storage. 3 14 F. Supp. at 549; supra text accompanying notes 28-3 1.
148. See, e.g., International Digital Sys. Corp. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 120 F.R.D. 445,450,
465 (D.D.C. 1988) ("[Mlistake or inadvertence is . . .merely a euphemism for negligence, and,
certainly . . one is expected to pay a price for one's negligence.") (quoting In re Standard Fin.
Management Corp., 77 B.R. 324, 330 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987) (alteration in original));
Underwater Storage, 314 .F. Supp. at 549 (''The Court will not look behind this objective fact
[of disclosure] to determine whether the plaintiff really intended to have the letter examined. Nor
will the Court hold that the inadvertence of counsel is not chargeable to his client.").
The traditional approach's second rationale, that the revelation of confidential communications makes the privilege no longer necessary, id., is also problematic. Knowledge of a
document's contents and ability to use the document in litigation are different things. See
Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v. Servotronics, Inc., 522 N.Y.S.2d 999, 1004 (App. Div.
1987). As many courts and commentators have noted, a protective order banning the use of the
revealed confidences will give some protection to the client. See, e.g.. id.; Data Sys., Inc. v.
Philips Business Sys., Inc., No. 78 Civ. 6015-CSH, at *7-*8 (LEXIS, Genfed Library, DIST
File) (S.D.N.Y. 1981). See generally Ayres, supra note 8, at 74 (noting there is a trend toward
maintaining the privilege despite disclosure); Note, supra note 1, at 607-09 (stating that a court
can prevent the use of a confidential document at trial). Another problem is when an adversary
knows of the existence of documents containing information damaging to the privilege holder,
but does not know the actual contents. See supra text accompanying notes 79-81. The facts
surrounding the disclosure in a particular case may point to a finding of waiver. However, rather
than imposing a blanket rule which would cover situations where an adversary has not actually
obtained the "gist" of a document's contents, and situations where the adversary has complete
knowledge, the reasonable precautions test uses the extent of the disclosure as one of the factors
used to determine the waiver issue. See Lois Sportswear, 104 F.R.D. at 105; supra text
accompanying notes 79-81. Presumably the more the adversary knows, the less likely the
privilege will be upheld. See supra text accompanying note 81.
149. Fleet Nat'l Bank v. Tonneson & Co., 150 F.R.D. 10, 13 (D. Mass. 1993).
150. See id.

.
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From a pragmatic point of view, the traditional view is equally
detrimental because it is not realistic to expect a client to take precautions against an attorney's inadvertent disclosure of privileged documents. It is one thing if the client has not taken any precautions and has
~ ~ this is the
allowed documents to be inadvertently d i s c l ~ s e d , 'but
exception in the disclosure cases; the overwhelming majority of cases
involve inadvertent disclosure by an attorney or agent of the attorney. lS2
Notwithstanding the criticism leveled at the traditional test, courts
continue to use it.lS3International Digital Systems Corp. v. Digital
Equipment Corp. exemplifies the traditional test's misplaced retributive
rationale.'" There, plaintiffs attorney inadvertently disclosed twenty
151. See e.g., Suburban Sew 'N Sweep, Inc. v. Swiss-Bemina, Inc., 91 F.R.D. 254, 256
(N.D. Ill. 1981) (holding that documents otherwise within privileged confidential attorney-client
communications were no longer privileged when recovered by a third party from the client's
garbage).
152. See, e.g., International Digital, 120 F.R.D. at 446-47 (noting that document
preparation included both attorneys and paralegals); Liggett Group v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 116 F.R.D. 205, 207 (M.D.N.C. 1986) (inadvertantly disclosed by attorney or
paralegal); Manufacturers & Traders, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 1002 (noting that the inadvertent
disclosure was due to a paralegal);
153. The traditional test is firmly accepted by the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia and its district court. See, e.g., In re Sealed Cases, 877 F.2d 976,980 (D.C.
Cir. 1989); In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ocean Transp., 604 F.2d 672,675 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom., Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. United States, 444 U.S. 915 (1979); Chubb Integrated
Sys. v. National Bank of Wash., 103 F.R.D. 52,66-67 (D.D.C. 1984). For example, in Wichita
Land & Cattle Co. v. American Fed. Bank, 148 F.R.D. 456, 457-58 (D.D.C. 1992), the court
reaffirmed its adherence to the traditional test of waiver, despite its acknowledgement that
reasonable precautions to avoid the disclosure of privilege documents were taken. The case arose
out of the FDIC's takeover of two savings and loan associations. Id. at 456-57. Plaintiffs
counsel inadvertently produced two privileged documents amongst "some forty boxes" of
documents produced. Id. at 457. When plaintiffs counsel became aware that defendants had seen
the privileged documents in their initial review of the forty boxes, counsel refused to meet
defendant's request that the documents be copied and delivered. Id. In granting defendant's
motion to compel production, the District Court for the District of Columbia, stated: "[Tlhe rule
in this Circuit is clear. Disclosure of otherwise-privileged materials, even where the disclosure
was inadvertent, serves as a waiver of the privilege." Id. The court refused to consider the
precautions taken by plaintiffs counsel to avoid disclosure, or that counsel acted immediately
upon learning of the error. Id. at 459. Its refusal was based on an adherence to stare decisis and
on its view that confidentiality, once breached, could not be regained. See id. "What is more
important than process or intent is that the confidentiality of the disputed documents has been
irrevocably breached." Id.
No other circuit court of appeals has specifically stated which waiver test should be used.
See Harding, supra note 9, at 475. At least one commentator has noted that the district courts
have not been given any guidance by the higher courts, and that this has led to a variety of rules
and forum shopping. Id. at 474-79.
154. See International Digital, 120 F.R.D. at 449-50.
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privileged documents among some 500,000 produ~ed.'~~
Although the
court recounted the extensive precautions taken to avoid a disclosure,
the court ruled that the inadvertent production waived the attorney-client
privilege as to those documents, and denied plaintiffs motion for a
protective order.Is6 The court held that the disclosure itself was proof
that the precautions were inadequate.'" Adopting the reasoning of the
traditional approach, the court noted that
[mlistake or inadvertence is . . . merely a euphemism for
negligence, and, certainly . . . one is expected to pay a
price for one's negligence[;]
. . . . a strict rule that "inadvertent" disclosure results in
a waiver of the privilege would probably do more than
anything else to instill in attorneys the need for effective
precautions against such disclosure.'"
The flaw in such reasoning is apparent: although the negligence is the
attorney's, the penalty hams the client, whose confidential materials
were exposed and used against him.'' The client pays the price for his
attorney's negligence.I6'

155. Id. at 446. The number of inadvertent disclosures compared to the extent of disclosure,
a factor courts using the reasonable precautions test consider, certainly would be deemed
reasonable. See supra note 76 for a list of cases which have analyzed this factor.
156. International Digital, 120 F.R.D. at 447-50. However, the International Digital court
refused to find a complete subject matter waiver, limiting the waiver to the documents disclosed.
Id. at 446 n.1.
157. Id. at 449-50.
158. Id. at 450 (second omission in original) (citation omitted) (quoting In re Standard Fin.
Management Corp., 77 B.R. at 330 (emphasis added).
159. See Harding, supra note 9, at 497 & 497 n.159.
160. See id. at 497. At least one court using the traditional test suggested that the client had
recourse against his attorney through a malpractice suit See Mendenhall, 531 F. Supp. at 955
("Mendenhall's lawyer . . might well have been negligent. . ."); see also Davidson & Voth,
supra note 8, at 646; Note, supra note 1, at 604 n.27. However, the feasibility of a successful
lawsuit based on an inadvertent disclosure of privileged documents is questionable. See Harding
supra note 9, at 497 n.159; Note, supra note 1, at 604 n.27. The elements of a tort action for
malpractice include (i) the duty to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as would the
reasonable attorney, (ii) breach of duty of care, (iii) proximate cause between the negligent act
or omission and harm to the plaintiff, and (iv) actual loss or harm to the plaintiff. See generally
DAVIDJ . MEISELMAN,
A ~ R N EMYA L P R A ~ C ~E : i AND
w PROCEDURE
14, 39-40 (1980)
(discussing legal malpractice). The plaintiff bears the burden of proving these elements. Id. at
39. The client may have difficulty in establishing that the attorney breached his duty to use
reasonable care. Harding, supra note 9, at 497 n.159. The duty of reasonable care requires only
that the attorney "render fair and reasonable professional services on a par with other attorneys
acting under similar circumstances." MEISELMAN,
supra, at 14. As noted by Harding, if the
attorney shows that he took reasonable precautions to avoid inadvertent disclosure, "a jury would

.

.
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While on its face it appears that the traditional test is the most
effective means of promoting attorney responsibility, in fact, the
opposite may be true.I6' The result of an inadvertent disclosure is an
automatic waiver;'62 however, unprofessional or sloppy conduct may
A blanket rule does not
not have been the cause of the discl~sure.'~~
discriminate between different degrees of care an attorney might take to
avoid disclosure and therefore does not reward professional excel1 e n ~ e . IThe
~ ~ traditional test may also result in the decreased flow of
information between attorney and client, in direct contradiction to the
purposes of the privilege.16'

B. Attorney Responsibility and the Subjective Intent Test
The subjective intent test demands that a client actually intend to
waive his privilege; therefore, the test eliminates waiver as a result of

probably find that reasonable care had been used." Harding, supra note 9, at 498 n.159.
Reasonable care may exist even if the attorney has violated his ethical responsibilities. See id.
Most cases hold that such a violation does not constiute malpractice. E.g., Palmer v. Westmeyer,
549 N.E.2d 1202, 1205 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988); Weiszmann v. Kirkland & Ellis, 732 F. Supp.
1540, 1544 (D. Colo. 1990); Peck v. Meda-Care Ambulance Corp., 457 N.W.2d 538, 541-43
(Wis. Ct. App. 1990).
Thus, even in a case using the traditional test of waiver, when the attorney's duty of care
is questioned, the issue, for malpractice purposes, ultimately comes down to whether the attorney
took reasonable precautions. See Harding, supra note 9, at 497 n.159. However, in using the
traditional test, something akin to a shifting of the burden of proof occurs. See MEISELMAN,
supra, at 39-40; Harding, supra note 9, at 497 n.159. As noted above, in the malpractice suit
that results from application of the traditional test's harsh waiver rule, the plaintiff will have to
supra, at
establish that the attorney did not follow a reasonable standard of care. MEISELMAN,
39-40; Harding, supra note 9, at 497 n.159. In contrast, under the reasonable precautions test,
the party seeking a protective order bamng the use of inadvertently produced documents bears
the burden of proving that reasonable care was taken to avoid disclosure. See Golden Valley
Microwave Foods, Inc. v. Weaver Popcorn Co., 132 F.R.D. 204,207 (N.D. Ind. 1990).
The client in a traditional test case also will likely have difficulty in establishing the
elements of actual harm and proximate cause. Harding, supra note 9, at 497 n.159. For a
thorough analysis of the feasibility of a malpractice suit based on an inadvertent disclosure, see
id. at 497 n. 159.
161. See Harding, supra note 9, at 497 n.159 (noting that with the difficulty faced by the
client in holding an attorney responsible for a disclosure, there is little pressure on the attorney
to be more careful).
162. Meese, supra note 9, at 536-37; Note, supra note 1, at 598.
163. See Wichita Land, 148 F.R.D. at 457-58 (holding that privilege waived despite
reasonable precautions to avoid disclosure taken by the attorney); Harding, supra note 9, at 497
n. 159.
164. See Harding, supra note 9, at 497 n.159.
165. See Meese, supra note 9, at 536-38. The goal of the privilege is to encourage frank
communication between client and attorney. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
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an inadvertent discl~sure.'~
Neither courts that reject the subjective
intent test nor commentators who espouse it have concentrated on the
broader question of attorney responsibility and the concomitant ethical
The subjective intent test is
considerations of ~0nfidentiality.l~~
even
completely ineffective in fostering attorney respon~ibility'~~
though it is undoubtedly the most effective means of upholding the
attorney-client privilege since waiver never occurs.169Its effectiveness
in upholding the privilege is the very reason that the subjective intent
An attorney
test does nothing to increase attorney re~ponsibi1ity.l~~
need not take any care in protecting against waiver if he knows no
sanctions will be visited upon hirn.17' From a cost-benefit analysis, he
would be foolish to spend time taking care to protect against inadvertent
disclosure because no harm, in terms of waiver, will occur if he is
careless.'" Instead, the subjective intent test improperly places the
burden of attorney responsibility on the recipient of the privileged
material^.'^^ The recipient, who already is at a disadvantage in that he
is not going to receive all relevant information because of the truthsuppressing function of the attorney-client privilege,'74 should not bear
this responsibility. Moreover, the attorney for the recipient should not
bear the burden of maintaining his opposing counsel's ethical responsibility to keep his client's confidence^.'^^

166. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
167. See, e.g., Hartman v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 763 P.2d 1144, 1152 (N.M. 1988)
(failing to address attorney responsibility and ethics while explicitly rejecting the subjective
intent test); Ayres, supra note 8, at 61 (focusing on the narrow question of what should
constitute waiver in the context of inadvertent disclosure rather than considering the broader
policy issue of attorney responsibility).
168. An argument could be made that recklessness or gross negligence on the attorney's
part would amount to a .waiver since the cases only speak in terms of mere negligence.
Mendenhall, 531 F. Supp. at 955.
169. See, e.g.. id. Rarely would a client admit an intent to disclose privileged materials.
WIGMORE,
supra note 3, 5 2327, at 636.
170. See Mendenhall, 531 F. Supp. at 955. The Mendenhall court held that without the
subjective intent to waive on the part of the client, a lawyer's negligent disclosure of privileged
information is not sufficient to waive the attorney-client privilege. See id. In effect, the
subjective intent test takes away the incentive for the attorney to protect a client's privileged
information because the privilege will not be waived by attorney negligence. See id.
171. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
172. See Mendenhall, 531 F. Supp. at 955.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 109-10 (stating that the receiving attorney is
responsible for screening the information believed to be privileged under the subjective intent
test).
174. WIGMORE,
supra note 3, 5 2291, at 554.
175. See Aerojet-General Corp. v. Transport Indem. Ins., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 867 (Ct.
App. 1993) (noting that the recipient of inadvertently disclosed material did not act in violation
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Commentators who support the subjective intent test suggest that
without an absolute rule against waiver, privilege will be secondary to
the search for information in a particular case.'" This fear is rnisplaced. The broad policy underpinnings for the attorney-client privilege
may or may not justify applying it in a case where the adversary knows
specific damaging information. Certainly circumstances exist where the
privilege may be upheld even though an adversary has seen specific
information. For example, courts do not allow a party or its agent to use
However, situations also
privileged materials that have been st01en.I~~
of any rule in keeping the material and that any duty the attorney owed was to protect the
interest of his own clients).
176. See, e.g., Meese, supra note 9, at 535-36. This fear was specifically rejected by the
court in Lien v. Wilson & McIlvaine, No. 87 C 6397, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5129, at *6 (N.D.
111. June 2, 1988), which, in denying a motion to compel production of an inadvertently
disclosed document, noted:
It is now necessary to comment upon defendant's claim that the relevance of the
document overcomes the privilege. It is a rare case, undoubtedly, in which access
to attorney-client material would not aid the search for truth. It is axiomatic that
the privilege may act in derogation of the truth. Nevertheless, it is believed that
overall the search for truth is enhanced by a client's full and complete disclosure
to one's attorney. Defendant has cited no authority for its proposition that the
probative quality of the evidence should determine whether the veil of privilege
should be lifted, and the court believes there is none.
Id. at *6.
177. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings Involving Berkley & Co., 466 F. Supp. 863, 869
(D. Minn. 1979), affd as modified, 629 F.2d 548 (8th Cir. 1980); State v. Sugar, 417 A.2d 474,
480 (N.J. 1980). See generally Kanellis, supra note 1 (discussing applicability of attorney-client
privilege to stolen information). In the past, courts did not follow the rule that stolen material
retained their privileged status. Id. at 269. The traditional view on involuntary disclosure, akin
to the traditional test on inadvertent disclosure, was that any disclosure waived the privilege. See
WIGMORE,
supra note 3, 5 2326, at 633. At least two proposed Federal Rules of Evidence dealt
specifically with involuntarily disclosed material. Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 503(a)(4)
stated: " 'A communication is "confidential" if not intended to be disclosed to third persons
other than those to whom disclosure is in furtherance of the rendition of professional legal
services to the client or those reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communication."'
Mendenhall, 531 F. Supp. at 955 n.8 (quoting proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 503(a)(4)).
Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 51 1 stated:

A person upon whom these rules confer a privilege against disclosure of the
confidential matter or communication waives the privilege if he or his predecessor
while holder of the privilege voluntarily discloses or consents to disclosure of any
significant part of the matter or communication. This rule does not apply if the
disclosure is itself a privileged communication.

FED.R. EVID.
51 1 (Proposed 1973). reprinted in Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and
Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 258 (1973).
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exist where waiver would be appropriate. For example, where an
adversary has seen and relied on information he inadvertently obtained,
the court may find the privilege waived.'78 Any absolute rule that does
not take into account the particulars of an inadvertent disclosure is
undesirable.
The subjective intent test's failure to encourage attorney responsibility may also compromise an attorney's vigilance in keeping his ethical
duty to maintain client confidences. Even though the attorney may be
subject to disciplinary proceedings for violating the professional rules
of conduct, an inadvertent waiver will not result in any legal repercussions to the case.I7' The client retains an evidentiary privilege against
use of the disclosed information, but is left with the knowledge that his
confidences were revealed and his privacy breached, possibly subjecting
him to embarrassment or other criticism.180
In sum, the subjective intent test, on its face the most protective of
the attorney-client privilege, in fact gives attorneys no incentive to avoid
inadvertent disclosure and therefore may ironically diminish both the
likelihood that client confidences remain undisclosed and client trust in
attorneys. As one court noted, the subjective intent test "poses the risk
of undermining the obligation of counsel to exercise due diligence and
to employ reasonable and effective screening procedures . . . ."18'

Congress did not enact these sections, passing instead the more general Federal Rule of
person . shall be governed by the
Evidence 501, which states: "the privilege of a
principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in
light of reason and experience." See FED. R. EVID. 501. However, courts and commentators
consider the proposed rules as a . guide to the existing Federal Rules of Evidence. See
Mendenhall, 531 F. Supp. at 955 n.8; Transamerica Computer Co. v. International Business
Mach. Corp., 573 F.2d 646, 651 (9th Cir. 1978); Kanellis, supra note 1, at 269.
178. See In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ocean Tramp., 604 F.2d at 674 (finding waiver
where adversary based deposition on information contained in privileged documents and
privilege holder waited 15 months before claiming that the documents were privileged).
179. See R u m REGULATINGTHE FLORIDABAR Rule 41.6 (1994). Each state has
procedures for filing complaints of breaches of ethical duties against attorneys. See, e.g., RULES
REGULATING
THEFLORIDA
BAR Rule 3-7.3 (1995). Typically, a grievance committee is
established to receive, investigate, and impose sanctions. See, e.g., id. Available sanctions
include censureship, suspension, and disbarment. See, e.g.. State ex rel. Florida Bar v. Munell,
74 So. 2d 221, 223 (Fla. 1954). However the extremely small amount of cases in which
attorneys' have been disciplined has eroded confidence in the self-governence of lawyers and
in the legal profession in general. See Edward D. Re, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with
the Legal Profession, 68 ST. JOHN'SL. REV. 85, 89 (1994).
180. See generally Davidson & Voth, supra note 8, at 641 (calling the privilege a
protection of privacy and stating that the client may not feel comfortable revealing confidences
if he knows others may have access to them).
181. Bras v. Atlas Constr. Corp., 545 N.Y.S.2d 723,725 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989); see also
Marcus, supra note 1, at 1636.

.. .

..
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C . Attorney Responsibility and the Reasonable
Precautions Test
Although courts and commentators never make specific reference to
it, attorney responsibility is seemingly the unspoken premise of most of
the factors considered in determining whether reasonable precautions
have been taken. For example, the first factor, reasonableness of
precautions taken,18' considers the mechanics of the overall document
production and how the accidental disclosure occurred.'83This analysis
focuses almost solely on what the attorney has done to cull privileged
documents.184Thus, where a client responded to a subpoena duces
tecum requesting all non-privileged documents by shipping the entire
non-segregated file to his attorneys, and the attorneys then failed to
remove all of the privileged materials, the court asked why the attorney
took no other precaution^.'^' The court was concerned with the level
of legal expertise of the screener and why a second screening was not
01dered.I~~
It is the attorney who must decide the appropriate screening structure
for the type of document production sought. For example, with a
voluminous production, an elaborate procedure with multiple layers of
review may be warranted. The more elaborate the screening procedure
devised by the attorney, the more likely it is that a finding of reasonableness will be made if an inadvertent disclosure occurs.187Of course,
a well-structured screening procedure should have the benefit of
reducing the number of inadvertent disclosures.188
On the other hand, procedures in place to avoid a clerical mistake
such as a missent fax may be nothing more than having adequate
clerical training. The courts have answered the question of whether a
' ~ ~issue
single clerical error will waive the attorney-client p r i ~ i l e g e , an

182. Lois Sportswear, 104 F.R.D. at 105.
183. See Kanter v. Superior Court, 253 Cal. Rptr. 810, 819 (Ct. App. 1988); supra notes
70-73 and accompanying text.
184. See Kanter, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 819.
185. See id.
186. Id.
187. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
188. See id. The procedure need not be so elaborate as to guarantee non-disclosure, but
only a reasonable procedure. See Lois Sportswear, 104 F.R.D. at 105. The level of precautions
needed has evolved, and will continue to evolve, as the courts rule on the cases before them,
thereby setting the standard of reasonableness as they do in other contexts where reasonableness
is the criteria.
189. See, e.g., Berg Elecs., Inc. v. Molex, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 261, 263 (D. Del. 1995)
(holding no waiver of privilege where law firm staff incorrectly photocopied documents that they
were instructed not to photocopy).
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the ABA addressed in its first opinion on inadvertent disclosure.1g0In
all such situations, the courts employing a reasonable precautions test,
or a variation of the reasonable precautions test, have refused to find a
waiver of the attorney-client pri~ilege.'~'In so doing, the courts have
implicitly established a standard of reasonableness that recognizes that
isolated clerical mistakes do happen.lg2 Therefore, to the extent the
ABA appears to have adopted a subjective intent test to avoid the
finding of waiver for the errant release of privileged materials,Ig3
adoption of a reasonable precautions test will create the same result,
without the costs the subjective intent test entails.lg4
Attorney responsibility also governs the second factor used in the
reasonable precautions test-the number of documents disclosed.195
The courts consider the total number of documents produced compared
to the number of privileged matters released and the production's time
frame.Ig6 One commentator has noted that considering a ratio of
privileged to non-privileged documents produced will encourage
attorneys to produce an excessive amount of documents that may add
additional time and expense to already protracted litigation.lg7Thus,
even criticism of the test centers on what an attorney might do. In fact,
the commentator's fears are misplaced because the courts are aware of
this litigation strategy and any attempt to "dump" documents on an
adversary would be evaluated as part of the "overall fairness" f a ~ t 0 r . l ~ ~
In any event, over-production of documents as a litigation strategy is a
double-edged sword since there is greater likelihood that privileged

190. See ABA, supra note 15, at 1001:158; supra text accompanying notes 97-98.
191. See, e.g., United States v. Zolin, 809 F.2d 1411, 1417 (9th Cir. 1987), a f d in part
and vacated in part, 491 U.S. 554 (1989) (vacating holdings regarding when an in camera
review is appropriate); Robertson v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., 143 F.R.D. 194, 198 (S.D.
111. 1992).
192. One would expect that the courts would not find that repeated clerical errors were
reasonable.
193. See ABA, supra note 15, at 1001:158; supra text accompanying notes 103-05.
194. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
195. Lois Sportswear, 104 F.R.D. at 105.
196. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text for citations to cases which compare
the number of documents to the number of disclosures.
197. Meese, supra note 9, at 542.
198. See Parkway Gallery Furniture, Inc. v. KittingerIPennsylvania House Group, Inc., 116
F.R.D. 46.51 (M.D.N.C. 1987) (considering charge of "document dumping*' in its five factor
review); Granada Corp. v. Honorable First Court of Appeals, 844 S.W.2d 223, 227 (Tex. 1992)
(reasoning that looking only to proportion of inadvertent disclosure to total disclosure may
encourage a flooding of discovery documents); Advance Medical, Inc. v. Arden Medical Sys.,
Inc., No. 87-3059, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7297, at 7-8 (E.D.Pa. July 18, 1988).
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matters will be d i s c l ~ s e d .Attorneys
'~~
should thus be discouraged from
document dumping.
The fourth and fifth factors the courts examine, promptness of
response to disclosure and overall fairness:00 also emphasize attomey
action. Typically, it is the attorney who moves to rectify the problem.
The attorney's failure to act promptly may cause the court to rule that
intent to waive existed, whereas an attorney's prompt action to retrieve
the material will inure to his benefit."'
The reasonable precautions test, which calls for an individual
examination of the details of the inadvertent disclosure:02 best promotes societal goals of encouraging attorney-client communications and
individual faith in the system. Additionally, it encourages and rewards
attorneys who take care to avoid inadvertent disclos~re?~while
protecting clients from bearing the heaviest burden of their attorneys'
lack of due care.204Blanket rules on waiver may be easy to apply, but
they are too broad to ensure the fair administration of each case or to
promote systemic benefits to society.205Thus the traditional test's
rigidity has led one court to criticize it as "atavistic, generating harsh
results out of all proportion to the mistake of inadvertent disclosure.'7206At the other extreme, never finding waiver as espoused by the
199. See Advance Medical, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7297, at *6. An additional risk of
document dumping that should discourage its use is that if there is an inadvertent disclosure the
courts may find a subject matter waiver and order the production of all other privileged
documents relating to the same subject. See, e.g., Hartman v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 763 P.2d
1 144, 1152-53 (N.M. 1988).
200. Lois Sportswear, 104 F.R.D. at 105. See supra text accompanying notes 82-92 for a
description of the fourth and fifth factors.
201. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
202. See Lois Sportswear, 104 F.R.D. at 105. See supra text accompanying notes 64-96 for
a description of the reasonable precautions test.
203. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 142 F.R.D. 276,279-80 (M.D.N.C. 1992).
204. See supra notes 148, 159-60 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 160 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the malpractice aspects of an inadvertent disclosure. Since
reasonable precautions, or the lack thereof, would be the basis of the client's suit against his
attomey, see supra note 160 and accompanying text, the reasonable precautions test best protects
the client.
205. Other situations exist where rules are moving from specific to more generalized
standards. For example, in the criminal law area, the legislatures have been moving from strict
tests of what constitutes provocation sufficient to reduce murder to manslaughter to more
flexible standards of measuring extreme emotional disturbance. Compare People v. Casassa, 404
N.E.2d 1310, 1316 (N.Y. 1980) (concluding that extreme emotional disturbance is measured
from the subjective viewpoint of the defendant, and then objectively assessed to determine
whether the disturbance was reasonable) with Commonwealth v. Bermudez, 348 N.E.2d 802,803
(Mass. 1976) (stating the Massachusetts rule that "[i]nsults or quarreling alone cannot provide
a reasonable provocation").
206. Mendenhall, 531 F. Supp. at 955 n.8.
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subjective intent test, may also generate unfair result^?^ Instead, the
appropriate waiver test should focus on the attorney's actions. The
reasonable precautions test allows for an examination of the totality of
the circumstances in detedning whether there has been a waiver
through inadvertent disclosure of the attorney-client privilege?08 This
test most fairly addresses the needs generated by large scale document
productions while placing the emphasis on the entity most responsible
for controlling the problem: the attorney. In doing so, the reasonable
precautions test best comports with the reasoning behind the attorney:
client privilege and with the ethical and legal obligations attorneys have
toward their clients.

D. The ABA Test and Attorney Responsibility
The ABA's approach to inadvertently transmitted documents appears
to state a blanket rule that a receiving attorney should return an
inadvertently disclosed document that on its face appears to be
confidential, because the receiving attorney will know that the document
is privileged and know that the sending attorney does not want him to
use it?"' In placing the confidentiality of the document above all other
concern^^^^ the ABA approach is similar to the subjective intent test
of waiver?" The blanket rule of "return and ignore" not only limits
the receiving attorney's ability to use inadvertently sent materials, it
places a burden on the recipient to rectify the situation by notifying the
sender and returning the document?'* In so doing, the ABA has
ignored the sending attorney's responsibility to take care to avoid
inadvertent disclosure and to bear responsibility when the disclosure
occurs.
To the extent that the ABA test is seen as adopting a subjective
intent test?l3 it fails to encourage attorney responsibility for the same
reasons that apply to the subjective intent test?14 The ABA test not
only does nothing to encourage attorney care, its reasoning is flawed
once it is extended beyond its factual setting, an isolated occurrence of

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Harding. supra note 9. at 484; see supra text accompanying notes 54-58..
Harding, supra note 9, at 478.
See ABA, supra note 15. at 1001:155.
Id. at 1001:155-56.
See Mendenhall, 531 F. Supp. at 955; see supra text accompanying notes 43-53 for
a description of the subjective intent test.
212. See ABA, supra note 15, at 1001:155.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 103-04.
214. See discussion supra Part IILB. Whether the ABA has, in fact, adopted the subjective
intent test is not clear. See supra text accompanying notes 103-05.
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an errant transmittal of a single document.215In that instance it is fair
to say that when an attorney receives a document addressed to someone
else but mistakenly faxed to him, he should know that the disclosure
was accidental. Return of the document seems the fair and just response.
The recipient cannot claim reliance since the error is immediately
apparent. However, the ABA test falters when one analyzes it against
the backdrop of a large document production. It may not be apparent to
the recipient that he is viewing privileged documents, and the burden
should not be placed on him to rectify the situation?I6 Because the
attorney had no part in the mistaken transmittal and may have already
relied upon the information contained in the document, the rule of
"return and ignore" is unrealistic and unfair.
As noted above, to the extent one views the ABA approach as
adopting the subjective intent test;l7 it does nothing to encourage
professional excellence?18 However, the ABA opinion does contain
language suggesting ABA endorsement of the reasonable precautions
test.219Reconciling the ABA opinion with the reasonable precautions
test is desirable for two reasons. First, doing so reduces the conflict
between the two sets of rules that protect client confidences, the attorney
client privilege and the ethical rules of professional resp~nsibility?'~
Second, since the reasonable precautions test best promotes attorney

215. The ABA's analogy to bailment law, ABA, supra note 15, at 1001:159-60, appears
to be most applicable in the context of the single errant document. In that situation, it would be
obvious to a reasonable person that the transmittal was not meant for the recipient. But in the
more common situation, not specifically addressed by the ABA opinion, a number of privileged
documents are released as part of a large-scale document production. See, e.g., Transamerica
Computer Co. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 573 F.2d 646,650 (9th Cir. 1978). It may
not be clear to the recipient that the sender did not intend him to use the materials. In such a
situation the recipient may not be the document's baiiee since as a general rule, a bailment does
not arise when possession of property passes to another by mistake. 8 AM. JUR. 2D Bailments
8 63 (1980).
216. See, e.g., Aerojet-General Corp. v. Transport Indem. Ins., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 865
(Ct. App. 1993) (reversing a sanction imposed on a recipient of inadvertently disclosed
information for not notifying the sender of the error and noting that the attorney had no legal
or ethical duty to the sender). The ABA opinion is specific to "materials that on their face
appear to be subject to the attorney-client privilege or otherwise confidential, under circumstances where it is clear they were not intended for the receiving lawyer." ABA, supra note 15, at
1001:155.
While the ABA opinion concerns a situation that arose out of a complex asbestos litigation,
the disclosure itself was not part of a massive document production, but was the result of an
isolated clerical error. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 103-04.
218. See discussion supra Part IILB. (discussing the failures of the subjective intent test).
219. See ABA, supra note 15, at 1001:158-59; supra text accompanying notes 104-07.
220. See discussion supra Part 11.
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responsibility, which, in turn, provides systemic benefits to s o ~ i e t y , ~ '
an interpretation of the ABA opinion that endorses the reasonable
precautions approach would also be most effective in promoting attorney
responsibility.
The ABA's endorsement of the reasonable precautions test is
apparent in a number of ways. First, the ABA's reliance on property
lends support to a reasonable precautions test as determinative
of when a recipient may make use of missent documents. More
specifically, when one speaks of the recipient "using" a privileged
document, one means that the recipient will be using the information
contained in the document. Assuming that the ideas contained in a
privileged document are themselves the sender's property:" one may
221. See discussion supra Part II1.C.
222. See ABA, supra note 15, at 1001: 159-60; supra notes 108-15 and accompanying text.
223. An in-depth analysis of whether raw information or ideas may qualify as property is
beyond the scope of this Article. However, when the raw information is contained in a document
covered by the attorney-client privilege, it becomes the creator's property because it has the
critical features of property. See Pamela Samuelson, Infonnation as Property: Do Ruckelshaus
and Carpenter Signal a Changing Direction in Intellectual Property Law?,38 CATH.U. L. REV.
365, 370 (1989). The term "property" is defined in terms of the property holder's rights. See
BLACK'SLAWD I ~ O N A R1217-18
Y
(6th ed. 1990). Typically, the rights include: (1) the right
to use, possess, and enjoy; (2) the right to transfer;' and (3) the right to exclude others. United
States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945). These are commonly referred to as
a "bundle of rights." See, e,g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979).
The definition works easily with tangible items or "things." See Samuelson, supra, at 370. ,
An individual's house, car, or merchandise belongs to that person and can be physically
possessed. Employing the "bundle of rights" test, the courts have also deemed certain intangible
items as one's property. See, e.g., Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Are Ideas Within the Traditional
Defmition of Property?: A Jurisprudential Analysis, 47 ARK. L. REV. 603, 605 n.5 (1994)
(noting that courts have considered pension rights, trade secrets, valid contracts, and real estate
liens as property).
Moving down the spectrum of tangibility, the law traditionally has been reluctant to classify
information or ideas as property. Sarnuelson, supra, at 365. One commentator has suggested that
the reluctance stems from the Age of Enlightenment principle that information should be shared
to stimulate innovation and to increase wealth. Id. at 367. Moreover, the difficulty in defining
what is meant by the term "information," and the fact that information is virtually incapable of
confinement, contribute to the difficulty in recognizing it as "property." Id. at 368. Therefore,
the law typically has not protected information, but rather, the form it takes. For example,
copyright and patent laws deem that a property interest arises, not in the ideas or information
that form the basis of one's work or invention, but the unique presentation of the information
or in the manner in which it may be used. Id. at 372-73 (discussing that what copyright laws
protect is the writer's "expression," or the form the information takes); see aka 35 U.S.C. 8 154
(1994) (stating that patent holders have the exclusive right to make, use, or sell their inventions
for 17 years).
The law of trade secret comes closest to holding that information is property. Samuelson,
supra, at 374. For a further discussion of trade secrets, see infra notes 224-56 and accompanying
text.
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make an analogy to the protection the law gives to other types of
confidential property.
For example, in the area of trade secret^:^ such as formulas or
customer lists, the law imposes not a strict. responsibility test, as
embodied by the traditional test of waiver:25 but a reasonable precautions testzz6to determine whether the confidentiality of such materials
should be enf~rced.'~'The reasoning employed by courts considering
trade secret questions is instructive on how the courts should view the
inadvertent disclosure of privileged communications. As with the
attorney-client privilege, the purpose of affording trade secret status to
certain types of information, and to protect them from disclosure or use
by one other than its holder, is to maintain the confidentiality of the
materials.228Thus, secrecy is the most important factor in trade secret
The Supreme Court has given some indication that it will consider some types of raw
information as one's property. See International News Sew. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215,
236 (1918) (finding a quasi-property interest in the results of one newspaper's news gathering
efforts); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984) (holding that property
interest in environmental data is cognizable as a trade secret). For an in-depth analysis of the
implications of these Supreme Court cases, see Samuelson, supra.
224. The Restatement of Torts defines a trade secret as one which
may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which
is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an
advantage over competitors who do not know or use it. It may be a formula for a
chemical compound, a process of manufacturing, treating or preserving materials,
a pattern for a machine or other device, or a list of customers.
RESTATEMENT
OF TORTS
8 757 cmt. b (1939); see also UNIF.TRADE SECRETS A m 5 1, 14
U.L.A. 433, 438 (1985) (defining trade secret as "information, including a formula, pattern,
compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that . . . (ii) is the subject of
efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy").
225. See supra text accompanying notes 28-3 1.
226. See supra notes 66-92 and accompanying text.
227. See, e.g., Defiance Button Mach. Co. v. C & C Metal Prods. Corp., 759 F.2d 1053,
1063 (2d Cir.) (stating that inadvertent disclosure of trade secrets is not waiver of protection if
reasonable precautions are taken to protect secrecy), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 844 (1985).
228. See Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 223, at 627-29. Professor Beckerman-Rodau takes
the position that, under certain circumstances, ideas may be deemed property. Id. at 649.
According to him, trade secrets law has developed to provide control over the access to such
ideas. Id. at 627-28. Unless confidentiality exists, the ideas will no longer be protected. Id. at
627. He notes,
Property rights in something normally do not depend on maintaining secrecy;
however, the definition of property requires that the owner has the right of
dominion and control over the thing and thereby the right to exclude others from
using it. If the trade secret owner fails to maintain secrecy, the trade secret will
become public information, and it will be impossible for the owner to exert any
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protection.229Without secrecy, the need for trade secret protection no
Thus if the material for which trade secret protection
longer e~ists.2~'
is sought is "readily a~certainable,'.'~' in other words, not secret, the
protection is
Yet even with the strict secrecy requirements
of trade secret law, the law of misappropriation of trade secrets uses a
reasonable precautions test to determine whether information is a trade
secret.u3 In other words, the law of trade secrets has not found that
disclosure per se is the decisive factor in denying trade secret protection; the issue is whether the holder of the trade secret took reasonable
precautions to protect it.234The courts will refuse trade secret protection, even where improper means were employed to obtain the materials,
if the holder did not take reasonable precautions against discl~sure?~~
The trade secret reasonable precautions standard directly parallels the
reasonable precautions test used to decide whether an inadvertently
disclosed document is still protected by the attorney-client privilege. The
following example demonstrates the extent of the similarities in concept
and treatment between the preservation of trade secret protection and of
privileged documents. Frank W. Winne & Son, Inc. v. Palmer,u6
involved a manufacturer whose trash was routinely taken by a rival
rnanufa~turer.~~
In the trash, the rival found customer invoices,
customer lists, purchase orders and other documents relating to the
manufacturer's pricing and territory.238The plaintiff claimed that the
materials found in the trash were trade secrets and sued its rival for
interference with its trade se~rets?~'
The rival argued that information

dominion and control over it.
Id.

229. Id.
230. Id.
231. See UNIF.TRADE SECRETSAm 3 1; supra note 227, at 438.
232. See, e.g., Defiance, 759 F.2d at 1063-64.
233. See supra text accompanying note 227.
234. The courts, in considering whether an item of information is entitled to trade secret
protection are asked to look to a number of factors including "the extent of measures taken . . .
to guard the secrecy of the information." Defiance, 759 F.2d at 1063.
235. See, e.g., id. at 1064, Julie Research Lab., Inc. v. Select Photographic Eng'g, Inc., 810
F. Supp. 513,520 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), a f d in part, vacated in part, 998 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1993);
Greenblatt v. Prescription Plan Servs. Cop., 783 F. Supp. 814, 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
236. No. 91-2239, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11 183 .(ED. Pa. Aug. 7, 1991).
237. Id. at *l.
238. Id.
239. Id.

.
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in the trash was not a protected trade secret because the plaintiff had not
taken adequate precautions to avoid disclosure.'*
The court agreed with the defendant and stated that the information
in the trash had probably lost its trade secret pr~tection.'~'As a
starting point, the court noted that, even though secrecy is the most
important factor in the law of trade secrecy:42 the standard by which
to judge whether a trade secret has been established is the degree of
reasonable precautions taken to ensure secrecy.243Thus, the issue
became whether the plaintiff, in putting its office documents in the
garbage and out for collection, took reasonable precautions to ensure the
secrecy of its materials. The Winne court relied on Fourth Amendment
cases that have held that "there is no reasonable expectation of privacy
in trash which is placed out for c~llection,"'~to find that plaintiff
failed to take reasonable precautions to protect its trade secret since it
could not, as a matter of law, have a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the tra~h.2~'
Almost identical facts faced the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois in Suburban Sew 'N Sweep, Inc. v. Swiss~ ~ instead of containing trade secrets, the trash left
Bemina, I ~ c . ' There,
out for collection consisted of drafts of confidential letters sent by a
client to his attorney, matters plainly protected by the attorney client
pri~ilege.2~~
As in Winne, the parties were business corn petit or^.^^'

240. Id. at *2.
241. Id. at *4. The court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss stating that the record
lacked the details necessary to grant the motion. Id. at *19. However, the court did state that.
"it is rather difficult to find that one has taken reasonable precautions to safeguard a trade secret
when one leaves it in a place where, as a matter of law, he has no reasonable expectation of
privacy from prying eyes." Id. at *11.
242. Id. at "3.
243. Id. at *7. The court also stated that " '[tlhe secrecy in which a purported trade secret
is shrouded need not be absolute but reasonable precautions under the circumstances must be
taken to prevent disclosure to unauthorized parties.' " Id. (quoting Anaconda Co. v. Metric Tool
& Die Co., 485 F. Supp. 410, 422 (E.D. Pa. 1980)).
244. Winne, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11183, at 810. See generally California v. Greenwood,
486 U.S. 35,40-41 (1988) (concluding that respondents lost their Fourth Amendment protection
by leaving garbage on a public street); United States v. Reicherter, 647 F.2d 397, 399 (3d Cir.
1981) ("Every circuit considering the issue has concluded that no reasonable expectation of
privacy exists once trash has been placed in a public area for collection."); Commonwealth v.
Perdue, 564 A.2d 489,493 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (holding that appellant had no expectation of
privacy in garbage left in a garbage can on private property but in an area that was open to the
public).
245. Winne, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11183, at *lo.
246. 91 F.R.D. 254 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
247. Id. at 256.
248. See id. at 255.
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Plaintiffs made it a practice of going through defendant's trash to look
for evidence to confirm their suspicions that defendants were engaged
in unlawful price di~crimination.2~~
Upon defendant's refusal to answer
interrogatories based on the documents plaintiff had found in the trash,
plaintiffs filed a motion to compel an~wers.2~
The Suburban court was
faced with the issue of whether materials placed in the trash maintain
their privileged status.=' At the outset, the Suburban court rejected the
traditional test that disclosure itself was conclusive proof of intent to
waive.=' Instead, it acknowledged the "modern trend" and applied a
reasonable precaution test as the measure of intent to ~aive.2'~
Though noting that the case presented, a "very close question," the
court concluded that reasonable precautions were not taken and that the
attorney-client privilege was waived.2s4 It noted, as did the Winne
court, that defendants could not have a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the trash since, under Fourth Amendment considerations, the trash
would have been deemed abandoned."' The finding of abandonment
was an indication that reasonable precautions were not taI~en.2'~
The courts have developed strikingly similar lines of reasoning in the
areas of trade secret protection and attorney-client privilege to decide
when they should protect a privileged document's confidentiality. The
ABA's analogy to property law to decide when an ethical obligation
exists to return inadvertently received documents257 is therefore
consistent with the reasonable precautions test.
Another way in which the ABA-opinion endorses the reasonable
precautions test is that, in support of its position that the fact of
disclosure alone should not strip a document of its confidential status,
the opinion specifies the five factors contained in the reasonable

249. Id. at 255-56.
250. Id. at 256.
251. Id. at 255.
252. Id. at 260.
253." Id.
254. Id. Commentators have criticized the Suburban holding because, notwithstanding its
rejection of the traditional test, it appeared to go beyond requiring that reasonable precautions
be taken, requiring instead that "all possible precautions" be taken. Kanellis, supra note 1, at
273; Davidson & Voth, supra note 8, at 643-45. Other courts have also criticized its mling. See,
e.g.. Mendenhall, 531 F. Supp. at 955 n.8 ("With all respect this Court does not concur in Judge
Leighton's conclusion that the 'case presents a very close question. .' ") (citation omitted).
255. Suburban, 91 F.R.D. at 256; see also Winne, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11 183, at *lo.
256. Suburban, 91 F.R.D. at 257. The court pointed out that evidence of the use of a
shredder or other measures to destroy the documents would have had bearing on whether
reasonable precautions were taken. Id. at 260. The Winne court made the same observation.
Winne, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11183, at *12.
257. See ABA, supra note 15, at 1001:159.

..
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precautions test that the courts consider in determining
Additionally, it refers to the rule embodied by the subjective intent test
as only a "minority" view and relegates Mendenhall, the seminal
subjective intent case to a f~otnote."~If the ABA had intended to
adopt a rule imposing an ethical obligation to automatically return
inadvertently disclosed materials, it would not have minimized the
relevance of the subjective intent test.

IV. CONCLUSION
Currently, three judicially created tests exist for determining whether
the inadvertent disclosure of privileged documents waives the attorneyclient pri~ilege.'~"These tests range from an absolute ban on waiver
based on inadvertent disclosure (the subjective intent test)261to an
absolute finding of waiver based only on the act of disclosure (the
traditional test).262In between lies the reasonable precautions test that
measures intent to waive by the steps taken to avoid inadvertent
Additionally, the ABA has promulgated a fourth test to
decide an attorney's ethical obligation to return inadvertently disclosed
that appears to adopt the subjective intent test, although
it may be reconciled with the reasonable precautions test.265Deciding
which test best serves the parties concerned should be based on the
underlying goals of the attorney-client privilege and the ethical duty to
maintain client confidences. The gpals of both are to promote client trust
Basing
in attorneys and to encourage the free flow of inf~rmation.'~~
a waiver test on attorney responsibility will best serve these goals. Since
it is, in fact, the attorney who controls the discovery process, a test that
measures the attorney's care should be the decisive factor in waiver
analysis. Under this analysis, the reasonable precautions test, which
places the most emphasis on attorney action, is the most appropriate
measure of intent to waive.

258. See id. at 1001 :158 (citing Hartman v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 763 P.2d 1 144, 1 152
(N.M. 1988)). The ABA opinion notes that "[a] review of the relevant cases demonstrates, with
few exceptions, an unwillingness to permit mere inadvertence to constitute a waiver. Something
more, like a failure of counsel to spend any time reviewing the documents to be produced in
discovery, is required before a waiver is found." Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
259. Id. at 1001:158 n.3.
260. See supra text accompanying notes 28-96.
261. See supra text accompanying notes 43-62.
262. See supra text accompanying notes 28-42.
263. See supra text accompanying notes 63-96.
264. See supra text accompanying notes 98-1 14.
265. See supra text accompanying notes 100-07.
266. See supra notes 1 16- 18 and accompanying text.
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